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ABSTRACT
Many computer security policies are written relatively vaguely. In many ways
this is intentional to allow for easier access to all the functionality of the computer
network. However, too much leeway allows users, without a need to access many of the
network functions, the ability to execute functions that might cause harm to the system or
provide access to information they have no need to see. With this in mind, this paper
takes a look at computer security. We start with a brief history of computer security and
continue with a look at internal security. Since our focus is on computer misuse and
detection, a look at internal security provides a look at the reasons why we should attempt
to monitor the activities of users. Misuse detection requires at least two features. These
are audit reduction and profiling ability. When audit features are enabled in the operating
system, massive files can build up. By establishing profiles of personnel usage, the
automated audit features can quickly scan audit files, look for usage that falls outside
what is determined to be normal, notify administrators, and delete old audit data. A
misuse detection system, such as the Computer Misuse Detection System marketed by
ODS Networks, may be implemented and incorporated into a comprehensive security
policy.
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As the end of the twentieth century approaches, the world finds itself in the
middle of a technological revolution with ever increasing dependence on computers and
computer systems. With this increasing dependence, the need to protect these systems
and the data contained within their databases has become a major priority for
governments and private industry. Recognizing the need to develop infrastructure
protection, the President of the United States signed Executive Order 13010 on July 15,
1 996 outlining a plan for dealing with critical infrastructure protection. It states that
"Certain national infrastructures are so vital that their incapacity or destruction would
have a debilitating impact on the defense or economic security of the United States."
The Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PPD 63), Protecting America's Critical
Infrastructures, builds on the recommendations of Executive Order 13010. Signed in
October of 1997, this report calls for a national effort to assure the security of the United
States increasingly vulnerable and interconnected infrastructures. PPD 63 is a
culmination of an intense, interagency effort to evaluate and act on the recommendations
of Executive Order 13010 and produce a workable and innovative framework for critical
infrastructure protection.
One aspect of this infrastructure protection is a need to correctly identify
personnel who have access to sensitive information and prevent the ones that do not have
access to this information. With the ever-increasing connectivity among networks
internal to an enterprise and between enterprises, the concept of user profiling has
continued to evolve. Profiling is not new, and has been used in many fields other than
information systems management. Federal Government agencies have become extremely
interested in developing user level computer profiling for their ever-increasing databases
of groups, subgroups, and individual users.
A well-defined computer security policy is the foundation of a successful security
program. Therefore, in order to take advantage of the potential power of having access to
user profiles, it is of paramount importance that profiling be incorporated into an
organization's computer security policy. The incorporation of monitoring users along
with periodic training will greatly enhance a systems security program.
B. OBJECTIVES
The objective of this thesis is two-fold. First, the evaluation and testing of a
commercially available computer profiling software was performed to determine if the
product can perform as advertised on Department of Defense type computer systems.
After reviewing several software packages, we selected an exemplary application
package that provided the necessary tools needed to perform user profiling. The
Computer Misuse Detection System (CMDS), developed by ODS Networks Inc.,
provides intrusion detection, data forensics, audit management, and a comprehensive user
profiling system. Our second objective was to incorporate a monitoring program into an
organization's computer security policy.
C. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
This thesis is divided into seven chapters. Chapter II provides a detailed look at
the evolution of computer history and the importance of computer security. Chapter III is
a comprehensive explanation on how computer systems are penetrated from internal
sources. Chapter IV takes a look at a relatively new aspect of computer security -
profiling; it covers the origins of profiling and reviews many of the current applications
that use profiling. A detailed overview of the Computer Misuse and Detection System
(CMDS) program is provided in Chapter V. The importance of a well-defined computer
security policy is explained in Chapter VI, followed by a discussion of the integration of
a system monitoring program into a current computer security policy, is discussed. The
conclusion and recommendations are presented in Chapter VII.
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
II. HISTORY OF COMPUTER SECURITY
A. OVERVIEW
Computers are used today more than ever before to conduct business transactions,
store sensitive data, and perform personal work at home. The ability to share information
has greatly increased as computers become connected to networks, creating computer
systems. The information contained within these computer systems is the major focus of
today's computer security policies. What is this information? It is information pertaining
to every detail of our lives - medical files, criminal investigation data, banking
transactions, and personnel files. It is information that we desire to keep private. Every
organization will have a unique computer security policy tailored to the organization's
specific needs. In order to fully understand the current direction computer security is
heading, with respect to profiling technology it is important to look at its modest
beginnings. This chapter briefly recounts the evaluation in computing environments and
the computer security that inevitably followed.
B. COMPUTER SECURITY FOUNDATIONS
The first step in developing any policy is to define the objective, in our case
computer security policy. What is computer security? In simple terms - it is the
protection of the computer system and all associated equipment. This includes both
physical and logical stores of data.
There are three fundamental cornerstones of computer security - confidentiality,
integrity, and availability. Confidentiality ensures that the data stored on a computer
system is protected and released only to authorized users. It include
s items such as payroll information, official email, or personnel data on employees. It has
significant meaning in a military environment. For example, message traffic that is
centrally stored and can be accessed by command personnel at various classification
levels ranging from unclassified to top secret. It is extremely important that only
personnel with the proper security clearance be able to read messages, at or below their
security level.
Integrity focuses on preventing unauthorized modification of data. For example,
integrity is extremely important to banking institutions, whose customers demand
accuracy in the computation and storage of very financial transaction. Within the
military, it is of the utmost importance to ensure that message traffic received is accurate
and has not been modified by hackers. Operational commanders need to know that
messages providing coordinates for missile strikes have not been modified by an
unauthorized party. An inaccurate message could result in a failed mission, civilian
casualties, or have significant political ramifications. Additionally, enemy hackers could
intercept and falsify information such as troop numbers, location or potential attack plans.
Availability is having data and other computing resources readily accessible on
demand. An Internet company would be quickly out of business if customers were
unable to access data on the company's web site. Computers are the cornerstone of most
military weapons systems. These systems need to have a high rate of availability in order
to conduct military operations at a moment's notice.
In addition to these fundamental properties, there are many secondary concerns
that must also be considered when developing a security policy, such as consistency,
control, and audits. Consistency involves making sure the system behaves as expected.
Control is regulating access to your system. Audits are performed to monitor the use of
the system by employees as well as access by outside interests.
C. THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES
All computer systems are susceptible to certain threats and are vulnerable to some
extent of attacks. Computer security is concerned with the protection of systems from
various threats and identification of vulnerabilities of the system. Anything that can
cause damage to a system is considered a threat. Threats fall into three distinct
categories: natural, unintentional, and intentional. [Ref. 1] Natural threats are unplanned
events such as fires, floods, or unexpected power surges. Unintentional threats primarily
can arise due to poor security training. For example, significant threats to computer
systems can come from a careless user that gives out his or her password to a friend, or a
system administrator that does not fully understand the security policy or how to maintain
security mechanisms (e.g., firewalls). However, there are many intentional threats out
there that can cause catastrophic damage to organizations. Intentional threats can be
either external or internal and come from a wide variety of sources. External threats are
the ones most people are familiar with, and consist of crackers, hackers, terrorist,
corporate raiders, or foreign intelligence agents. They penetrate systems using a variety
of methods ranging from remote electronic break-ins to bribing employees for
information. Internal threats come from personnel who have access to the system and for
some reason, possibly out of malice, decide to disrupt or steal information. These threats
can come from corporate spies being paid to acquire corporate secrets or simply a
disgruntled employee. It has been estimated that as many as 80 percent of system
penetrations come from personnel that had full access to the system performing
unauthorized functions. [Ref. 1]
There is no such thing as a completely secure computer systems: every computer
system has an Achilles heel. It is important to understand the vulnerabilities of a system
when developing a security policy. System vulnerabilities can be divided into the
following categories: [Ref. 1]
• Physical Vulnerabilities - Office building and computer rooms should be
secured to prevent break-ins from intruders. Many devices are available to
prevent intruders from gaining access; cipher locks, retina scans, voiceprint,
fingerprint and security alarms all provide an effective deterrent.
• Natural Vulnerabilities - Natural disasters such as floods, fires or power
surges that can cause loss of data.
• Software Vulnerabilities - Software failures can cause your computer system
to crash. They might also contain "holes" and/or "trap doors" that can allow a
hacker access to your system and information.
• Emanation Vulnerabilities - The sensitive electronic equipment that makes up
a computer system is extremely vulnerable to electromagnetic attack.
Additionally, all computers emit electromagnetic radiation that contains
information. This information, with the proper equipment, can be collected
and recorded.
• Communication Vulnerabilities - Any computer connected to a network runs
the risk of being penetrated from a remote location.
• Human Vulnerabilities - Employees are the leading cause of many security
problems and this makes them one of the greatest vulnerabilities to a computer
system. [Ref. 1]
D. EVOLUTION OF MODERN COMPUTING ENVIRONMENTS
In the early days of computing, computer systems were large and extremely
expensive. Many times entire systems were dedicated to single users or at most a select
few, who simply had to clear the computer's memory, pick up their computer tapes,
punch cards, and lock up the office at the end of the workday to protect both their
systems and information from intruders. [Ref. 2] The user had complete control of the
operating environment. Computer security was simply part of the organization's physical
security plan. The organization's primary security concerns centered on physical break-
ins, theft of the actual computer equipment, and theft of computer disks, tape reels, or
punch cards.
Prior to the 1980's, the fear of an insider threat was of little concern to most
organizations. Very few people were knowledgeable computer users and the select few
that actually worked on the computers did so in secured locations. Most users never saw
the computer systems that performed their everyday tasks. Users submitted screened
batch processing jobs and retrieved the results.
As times changed, computer technology also evolved. During the late 1960's,
users began to interact with computers more frequently and started to demand better
utilization of computing resources. The computing environment began to shift from
central control to decentralized computing. This change in computing paradigms
provided users with more control over their computing resources, while opening the door
for new possibilities for computer misuse.
The ability to access computers from remote locations revolutionized the
computer age. With the increase in telecommunications, computer "networks" grew in
size and complexity. Many large businesses began to automate and store information
about their customers, vendors, and commercial transactions.
Network-based computer access had a dramatic impact on education. Colleges
and universities throughout the country now found it possible to link themselves into
large computer networks and centralized computer databases. The first major network
for education and government use was the Arpanet, which later evolved into the Internet.
This explosion in computer availability provided students the opportunity to experiment
and work with computers for the first time. This created a "snowball" effect leading to a
tremendous increase in the total number of people using computers. The mystique of an
open computing environment began to slowly fade, as threats and attacks became
commonplace.
The introduction of the personal computer during the 1980's provided access to an
even greater number of people. The personal computer began to appear on desks in both
the workplace and at home. As the price of computers began to steadily drop, many
small businesses saw this as an opportunity to automate their operations to stay
competitive with larger companies. The advent and availability of the personal computer
presented another challenge to computer security. People could now create programs at
10
home to steal information or disrupt operations. Moreover, data that needed to be
transferred between systems was stored on diskettes and could now be easily downloaded
and stolen.
During the late 1 980's and early 1 990's, the use of the personal computer
increased at an exponential rate. As this use increased, so did the use of networks,
electronic mail, and bulletin boards. These new developments in computing increased
the ability of users to communicate with each other and other computer systems. This
new freedom in computing opens a whole new playground for hackers. Before the wide
spread use of networks, a hacker might be able to penetrate a single system at a time via a
modem. Now a would-be hacker has the potential to access many systems with a single
break-in and has the ability to disrupt computer systems throughout the world.
The 1 990's saw the emergence of open systems as well as an increasing
dependence on networks and the need to share data, applications, and hardware
resources. In the past, security was not considered a major concern, but with the advent
of the INTERNET, the ability to "reach out and touch" a network has gone global.
E. SECURITY EFFORTS
The earliest computer-related security activities began in the 1950's. The United
States government, understanding the potential security risks related to computers, took
some initial steps to protect government computing resources. The first TEMPEST
(Transient Electromagnetic Pulse Emanation Standard) security standard was designed to
take advantage of the fact that all electronic equipment emits signals that can be received
outside the system. Additionally, the first government security organization, the United
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States Communications Security (COMSEC) Board, was established to oversee the
protection of classified information and consisted of representatives from many different
branches of the government.
This modest attempt at providing for computer security provided the foundation
upon which advances were made in computer security. The Department of Defense,
National Security Agency, and the National Bureau of Standards all started security
initiatives. These initiatives combined with the first public awareness of security
emerged toward the late 1960's.
1. Public Awareness
The first major public awareness of computer security came from the Spring Joint
Computer Conference of 1967. This conference is generally recognized as the first
comprehensive computer security presentation to a technical audience. The presentation
was chaired by Willis H. Ware of the RAND Corporation and addressed the complicated
issues surrounding the vulnerabilities of resource sharing and remote access computer
systems. Topics included electromagnetic radiation, wiretaps on communications lines,
unauthorized programmers, and user access to systems and data.
2. Department of Defense Initiatives
The Department of Defense was one of the first organizations to use computer
systems and had a strong interest in protecting classified information stored on these
systems. In October of 1 967, the Department of Defense established a task force within
the Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA). The goal of the task force was to
study various computer systems and networks, identify vulnerabilities and threats, and
make recommendations for safeguarding and controlling access to Department of
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Defense computers, systems, networks, and information. After over two years of
examining the problem, the task force published the classified document called Security
Controlsfor Computer Systems in 1970. This document was the first of it kind and was
the foundation for many security programs that followed, dedicated to the protection of
classified information.
The Department of Defense began to develop regulations for enforcing the
security of the computer systems, networks and classified data used by the Department of
Defense and government contractors, and in 1972 issued DoD directive 5200.28, Security
Requirementsfor Automated Data Processing (ADP) Systems. This directive established
a consistent DoD policy for computer system control and stated the following as its
overall policy:
Classified material contained in an ADP system shall be safeguarded by
the continuous employment of protective features in the system's hardware
and software design and configuration. [Ref 1 ]
This directive was the first formal document establishing a computer security policy for
an organization. It was unique in the fact it stipulated that systems specifically protect,
not only the computer equipment, but also the data contained within the systems from
deliberated and inadvertent access to classified material by unauthorized persons.
Throughout the 1970's many computer security initiatives were developed to
better understand computer systems vulnerabilities and to find a way to combat threats.
The initiatives fell into three general categories: tiger teams, security research studies,
and the development of the first secure operating system.
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a. Tiger Teams
The 1970's saw the emergence of government- and industry-sponsored
tiger teams. The tiger teams consisted of a group of hackers who attempted to break into
computer systems to identify weaknesses in security mechanisms. Once weaknesses
were found, the team would develop "patches" to secure the holes. While tiger teams
provide an effective way of locating vulnerabilities, the teams' efforts were often
uncoordinated and could not necessarily find all the security problems that existed within
any one system. Often tiger teams found security flaws that were missed by previous
tiger teams. Therefore, one could not be guaranteed a secure system just because one
tiger team could not penetrate the system. The tiger team concept was the first organized
attempt at providing a solution to the ever-increasing problem of computer attacks. Even
though tiger teams have not always been effective, they have shown how easily security •
flaws in systems can be exploited. They have also pressed the need for a more efficient
and standardized method of testing and evaluating both security policy and its
implementation.
b. Modeling
While tiger teams were busy identifying security flaws, various
government agencies began sponsoring groundbreaking research projects. These projects
were designed to analyze security requirements, construct security policy models, and
provide recommendations to government officials. Several significant views on
computer security emerged from these research projects. The first of which was the
concept of a reference monitor. James P. Anderson first reported the reference monitor in
the Computer Security Technology Planning Study written in 1972.
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The reference monitor enforces security by forcing all subjects who wish
to access an object to do so only through the monitor itself. [Ref. 3]
The concept of a reference monitor becomes extremely important in the development of
standards and technologies for a secure system. The reference monitor makes access
control decisions based on a set of rules, that describes which subjects can access which
objects. The rules can specify certain files or objects and will represent a synopsis of the
access control policy and model chosen for the system.
Additionally, the first organized effort to establish a security policy model
was by the Department of Defense, who sponsored many projects in the late 1970's
focusing on the development of mathematical models of security. The two most
significant of the models are known as the Bell-LaPadula model and the Clark-Wilson
model.
The Bell and LaPadula model was of great interest to the Department of
Defense because it enforced the military's goal to eliminate unauthorized disclosure and
provide for the declassification of sensitive information. While this model was extremely
useful for military computer systems, it posed many challenges for commercial
organizations whose processing of sensitive information differed substantially from that
of the military and intelligence communities.
To address the needs of the commercial industry, David Clark and David
Wilson developed a security model that focused on the integrity of the information rather
than its actual disclosure. As more businesses started to rely on commercial data
processing to keep track of their financial records, it became necessary to prevent
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unauthorized modification of that data. It uses two types of mechanisms to accomplish
this goal: well-formed transactions and separation of duties.
The well-formed transaction is an electronic audit log that ensures users
cannot randomly change data. This gives the system administrator the ability to recreate
the actions of a user in the event of a computer security breach and restore the original
data if needed. Audit logs do not physically stop a would-be intruder from accessing and
changing data, but the knowledge a system exists can be a deterrent.
The second mechanism used in the Clark-Wilson model is separation of
duty. The goal of separation of duty is to maintain the integrity of data by separating the
operations required to modify the data into several parts and requiring that different users
perform each part. By increasing the number of employees required to complete task, it
increases the difficulty of committing fraud without being caught.
The purpose of this model is not only to stop unauthorized users from
modifying sensitive accounting and financial data, it also addresses issues related to
authorized users that have access to sensitive information. While computer security, up
to this point in history, was focused on denying access from outside threats, this was the
first significant attempt in combating the insider threat.
As time went on, other models were developed to address more specific
security concerns. For example, the Goguen-Meseguer model addressed the issue of
noninterference between subjects. It is designed to prevent users from interfering with
one another.
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c. The Development of Trusted Computer Systems
While many government-sponsored projects focused on the development
of security models in the early 1 970's, others began to develop the first trusted systems.
The key to developing a trusted system is the security kernel. The security kernel is the
part of the operating system that controls access to all of the computer resources and is
the bottom layer in a multi-layer system design. The formal definition of the security
kernel as defined in the "Orange Book" is:
The hardware, firmware, and software elements of a Trusted Computing
Base that implement the reference monitor concept. It must mediate all
access, be protected from modification, and be verifiable as correct. [Ref.
1]
The most significant development of the security kernel came from an Air
Force sponsored project for the Multics (Multiplexed Information and Computing
System) System. The Multics System is significant in the fact that it allows users with
different security clearances to simultaneously access information that has been classified
at different levels and was extremely important in the development of future trusted
systems. It features a large-scale highly interactive computer system that provides
extensive password and login controls. Additional features include the following: data
security through access control lists (ACLs), an access isolation mechanism (AIM),
auditing of all system access operations, decentralized system administration, segmented
virtual memory, and a stacked-controlled process architecture.
17
F. STANDARDIZATION
Toward the end of the 1970's, the need for standards was recognized as being of
paramount importance. As a result, two significant government initiatives were started to
conduct research in the area of computer security standards. The first initiative was
started in 1 977 and was simply titled the DoD Computer Security Initiative. The primary
goal of this initiative was to bring computer security into the national spotlight. A series
of seminars conducted in 1978 set out to answer questions relating to computer security.
As a result of this initiative, the National Security Agency (NSA) was given the
additional responsibility of information security. The Computer Security Center (CSC)
was created within NSA to expand on the Computer Security Initiative. The CSC
became known as the National Computer Security Center (NCSC) in 1985 and its role
was expanded to include all federal agencies having the following goals: [Ref. 4]
• Encourage the widespread availability of trusted computer systems.
• Evaluate the technical protection capabilities of industry and government
developed systems.
• Provide technical support of government and industry groups engaged in
computer security research and development.
• Develop technical criteria for the evaluation of computer systems.
• Evaluate commercial systems.
• Conduct and sponsor research in computer and network security technology.
• Develop and provide access to verification and analysis tools used to develop
and test secure computer systems.
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• Conduct training in areas of computer security.
• Disseminate computer security information to other branches of the federal
government and to industry.
One of the most important publications by the NCSC was the Department of
Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), commonly known as
the "Orange Book." The Orange Book has been widely considered the bible of secure
system development. [Ref. 1 ] It was the first publication to address the evaluation
criteria used to access the level of trust that can be placed in a computer system. It
effectively makes security a measurable commodity by determining the exact level of
security a system needs. The Orange Book defines specific levels of security protection,
D, C, B, and A, in order of increasing security. These levels are further divided into one
or more classes, with each class having a specific set of criteria that the system must meet
in order to obtain the rating for that class.
The second initiative came from the National Bureau of Standards (NBS). In
1977 the NBS started a series of Invitational Workshops dedicated to the Audit and
Evaluation of Computer Systems. The goal of the first workshop was to determine:
What authoritative ways exists, or should exist, to decide whether a
particular computer system is "secure enough" for a particular intended
environment or operation, and if a given system is not "secure enough,"
what measures could or should be taken to do so. [Ref. 1]
The members of the workshop considered many aspects of computer security before
making their recommendation. The final conclusion of the workshop stated:
By any reasonable definition of "secure" no current operating system
today can be considered "secure"...We hope the reader does not interpret
this to mean that highly sensitive information cannot be dealt with
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securely in a computer, for of course that is done all the time. The point is
that the internal control mechanisms of current operating systems have too
low integrity for them to...effectively isolate a user on the system from
data that is at a "higher" security than he is trusted.. .to deal with. [Ref. 1]
Many significant recommendations came from the NBS workshops. They
determined that sensitive government information not covered by national security
guidelines required a detailed computer security policy. Additionally, the workshop
attendees identified the need for formal evaluation and accreditation process for
information systems that manage sensitive information. The most significant
recommendation was to establish a standard method of measuring the overall security of
a computer system.
While the NCSC.and NBS were pioneers in the development of computer security
standards, many other standards were authored and had a significant impact on the
realization of trusted computing. Major advances in cryptography, electromagnetic
radiation, biometrics and other enabling technologies have all helped to reduce the
susceptibility of information systems to threats and vulnerabilities.
G. LEGISLATION ADDRESSING COMPUTER SECURITY
Legislation has been passed over the years dealing with both computer crime and
the protection of classified and sensitive information. The legislation has influenced the
way computer security is addressed both in the public and private sectors. Computer
crime legislation began during the infant stage of computer development and continues
today.
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In addition to the numerous U.S. Codes dealing with computer crime, many laws
have been enacted that specifically deal with the protection of classified and sensitive
information. These laws were a direct result of the ever-increasing national awareness of
the importance of computer security.
The National Security Decision Directive 145 (NSDD 145) of 1984 had a
tremendous effect on the world of computer security. Not only did it mandated
protection of both classified and sensitive information, it also empowered the NSA to
"encourage, advise and if appropriate assist" the private sector. Specifically, it requires
all computer systems that handle classified or sensitive information be protected against
unauthorized access. While classified information is pretty well defined, sensitive
information would include such things as productivity statistics, information that could
disrupt public services, and all information collected from the Social Security
Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Internal Revenue Service, and the
Census Bureau. In addition to protecting classified information, NSDD 145 created a
System Security Steering Group that consists ofmembers from the DoD, Attorney
General's Office, State Department, Treasury Department, Office of Management and
Budget, Federal Bureau of Investigation as well as many others. This interagency group
manages computer security within the government and provides policy and guidance to
all government agencies.
The National Telecommunications and Information System Security Publication 2
(NTISSP 2) was developed to better define "sensitive but unclassified" information. It
basically states that "sensitive but unclassified" information is information that could
adversely affect national security. The NTISSP 2 applies to all government agencies and
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contractors and allows the agency itself to determine what information is "sensitive but
unclassified" and to provide adequate protection of this information.
In an effort to further protect sensitive government information, the Computer
Security Act of 1 988 went into effect. It requires that a customized security plan be
developed for all U.S. government computer systems that contain sensitive information.
Additionally, it requires that all government employees that have access to computer
systems that contain sensitive information receive formal training in the field of computer
security.
H. SUMMARY
The modern computing environment shows little resemblance to its predecessor
of the 1950's. Today's computing relies on huge computer networks that transfer large
quantities of information between systems. The speed in which information can be
processed and transferred is always increasing and a need to protect this sensitive
information is a major concern among government agencies and private organizations.
Computer systems are vulnerable to various threats including; physical threats, natural
threats, software-related attacks, and electronic attacks. To combat these costly attacks,
many computer security initiatives were developed. The earliest computer-related
security activity began in the 1950's with the TEMPEST standard. The United States
government founded its first security organization, the COMSEC board, to oversee the
protection of classified information. During the late 1 970's, the need for standards was
determined to be of the utmost importance. Throughout the 1980's and 1990's many
computer related standards were developed and numerous legislation was passed to help
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ensure the protection of sensitive information. Recently, two significant pieces of
legislation were enacted to develop infrastructure protection within the United States.
Executive Order 13010 outlines a plan to deal with infrastructure protection and PPD 63
calls for an interagency effort to evaluate past recommendations and create a framework
for critical infrastructure protection.
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Bruce Schneier, author of the book E-mail Security and President of Counterpane
Systems said:
The only secure computer is one that is turned off, locked in a safe,
buried 20 feet down in a secret location - and I'm not completely
confident of that one either.
However, if we were to lock our computers away, no work would be accomplished by
utilizing them. As an advanced society we have become increasingly dependent on
information systems. We must find a way to keep them safe and secure—not only from
outsiders, but insiders as well.
Insiders are legitimate users of a computer. They use their knowledge to
circumvent computer security protection and are likely to have specific goals and
objectives as well as the ability to determine the best method to attain their objective
based on their knowledge of the system. In a recent survey of security managers, more
than 24 percent of those asked stated that the primary threat affecting their systems was
insiders. [Ref. 5]
According to a 1998 survey by the Computer Security Institute, approximately 70
percent of organizations polled reported that their networks had been penetrated. About
67 percent of these attacks were from inside the network. So it appears that a network
would have a 33 per cent chance of penetration from outside the network, and a 67 per
cent chance of penetration, or abuse, from inside the network. Yet most of the research
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into protecting information from harm has been placed on protection from "outsiders".
[Ref. 5]
The February 28, 1994 Joint Security Commission report to the Secretary of
Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence found that: "The great majority of past
compromises have involved insiders, cleared persons with authorized access who could
circumvent physical security barriers, not outsiders breaking into secure areas."
The commission highlighted two areas that they felt required particular attention:
Personnel security and the trustworthiness of those who deal with sensitive information
and Information Systems security requires increased attention. [Ref. 6]
B. WHO REPRESENTS THE INSIDER THREAT?
1. The Espionage Threat
Spies are generally paid informants that infiltrate computer systems from the
inside for the purpose of selling the information to competitors, or foreign governments,
for profit. Information brokers have paid employees with access to provide data on
unpublished telephone numbers, toll records, credit reports, and other personal
information. [Ref. 5] In the case of government information, the information is passed to
foreign governments. Weather it is industrial, technical, or military information, these
activities are illegal.
2. Disgruntled Employees
Disgruntled employees can be extremely damaging to a network. Of particular
danger is when someone with excessive knowledge of your system, such as a system
administrator, decides to cause harm. A computer systems administrator for a large
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defense contractor in California planted a logic bomb in one of the computer systems
used by the corporation in the development of advanced weapons systems. The
employee was due to be terminated and had set up the malicious code to activate after his
departure. He hoped that the company would hire him back to reconstruct databases after
the logic bomb functioned. His attempt was discovered before he left the company, and
he later pleaded guilty under a plea bargain arrangement. [Ref. 6]
3. Compromised/Coerced Employees
A sailor with access to keys that has been caught by others, doing things that
could be shameful and embarrassing, might be blackmailed into doing things he might
not otherwise do. This could result in their compromise and exploitation by others
without access to the network. As part of a security program, behaviors of a questionable
nature must be taken into consideration.
4. Poorly Trained or Careless Users
Poorly trained personnel are not a normal threat. The problem here lies in
accidentally destroying files, poorly designed passwords, or just doing something stupid
that affects the network causing lost time and money. Deleted database files, important
documents, even entire directories may be unwittingly deleted by someone with little
computer experience. Poorly designed passwords are a problem that could allow
someone easy access from the outside. Social engineering by outsiders to get login and
password information is something that must be taught through training. Exposure of
you system to users should be limited to only the privileges required to perform their job.
If someone doesn't need access to a specific computer or certain files, then don't give
them access. [Ref. 3]
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5. Former Employees
Former employees, if not properly debriefed, may retain the ability to log onto
their former network. They may have intimate knowledge of the system, user
identifications, and passwords. As with the disgruntled employee, they may also bear a
grudge against their former employer and seek retribution. Care must be taken to ensure
that their ability to access the system is removed. Co-workers that may have shared
information about their login and password should be reminded to change their
passwords when a peer leaves the shop as well as warned about sharing changes to the
information systems policies. [Ref 5]
6. Vendors and Contractors
Vendors and contractors present a unique threat. They are exceptionally familiar
with the systems they install and maintain. However, they do not fall under the same
guidelines as company employees. It is easy for a programmer from a vendor company
to leave backdoors, which would allow them unlimited access to the system from a
remote location. Employees of a vendor may cause more damage than your most
untrustworthy user. Therefore it is wise to know the hiring and security practices of
vendors with which you do business in order to reduce this threat. Closely monitor the
activities of all vendors and contractors when they are on the site. A trusted employee
should be with the vendor employee at all times while working on the system if possible.
[Ref. 3]
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C. EXAMPLES OF INSIDER ABUSE
The following examples of insider abuse show the seriousness of the insider
threat: [Ref. 5]
In 1988, a Libyan intelligence agent obtained names, addresses and phone
numbers of more than 1,000 federal employees at U. S. military and intelligence
agencies. The information was obtained from his wife, who had access to the
Metropolitan Washington Council of Governments listing for carpooling purposes
through her job as a computer operator with the Virginia Department of Transportation.
This was information that could have been used to assist in a terrorist operation.
Two Israelis associated with Israel's nuclear-weapons program illegally accessed
a supercomputer at the Los Alamos National Laboratory's nuclear weapons facility in
New Mexico. They used a friendly lab technician's access code and personal computer
to connect into an unclassified but highly sophisticated Cray computer to work on
designs for a nuclear-weapon detonator.
In 1993, the General Accounting Office determined that insiders posed the
greatest threat to the National Crime Information Center. Fifty-six examples of
intentional insider misuse was cited. Most of this misuse was relatively harmless use of
information for personal purposes, for profit, or for political gain. In some cases, the
misuse of information jeopardized the safety of citizens and potentially of law
enforcement personnel. The most extreme example involved a former law enforcement
officer who obtained information from three other officers and used it to track down and
murder his girlfriend. Another case involved a female terminal operator conducting
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background searches for her boyfriend to determine whether or not clients of his drug
operation were undercover agents.
According to a report of the Internal Revenue Service, as of 1993, 369 employees
of the southwest region offices had been investigated or disciplined for using government
computers to create fraudulent tax refunds or to browse through tax records of friends,
relatives, neighbors and celebrities. One employee had altered approximately 200
accounts to receive kickbacks from bogus refund checks.
Social Security Administration officials revealed how insider accomplices
assisted a West African credit card fraud ring by looking up records of credit card
customers and providing the West Africans with additional identifying information to
activate those cards. Twelve employees and three contract security guards were allegedly
involved in selling the information for $10 to $50 per record. Officials believe that files
on approximately 20,000 people have been accessed in this manner.
A fairly recent Los Angeles Times report by Ralph Vartabedian stated that low-
level employees at federal payment centers embezzled money ranging from $ 1 1 ,000 to
$3 million each by exploiting loopholes in the government's troubled accounting system.
All of these examples lead to one conclusion. The insider threat is real. Insiders
already have access to your system and do not have the added burden of circumventing
firewalls, routers, and proxy servers.
D. EXPLOITABLE VULNERABILITIES [Ref. 6]
The most widely exploited vulnerability by an insider is the lack of controls and
checks to prevent him from removing sensitive documents, computers, or media from the
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work area. And the problem has increased over the past decade as exit checks have
relaxed and restrictions in response to the easing of the Cold War tensions, reductions in
manning, and increased employee use of portable and home computers. Employees
usually have the ability to modify, manipulate, and delete data that they may access.
Now they have the ability to email information via the Internet to anywhere in the world.
Copying and physically removing information is virtually undetectable.
Employees with privileged access have the ability to cause the greatest harm and
can do more than compromise information. Systems programmers may introduce
malicious codes such as viruses, time bombs, or Trojan Horses. These could result in
denial or disruption of service at predetermined times. Backdoors could be introduced
for the exfiltration of information. Systems administrators could make nearly
imperceptible changes to files, data, and access permissions as well as obvious changes
such as denying access or taking control of the entire system. It is believed that the
incorporation of commercial software into government information systems will only
increase the risk of a vulnerability
.
An insider with authorized access may use his inside status to launch attacks
which could give him unauthorized access. Already existing inside a firewall reduces the
hardship a hacker endures just to get inside a system. In the case of a military or
government system, this access could be to Top Secret information that if released to
foreign governments could cause grave damage to our national security—such as the
recent Los Alamos Labs nuclear secrets release to the Chinese government.
An untrustworthy insider might be used to facilitate access to an outsider. The
insider could be used to insert viruses for someone else. They may share passwords to
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remote login access. If they are good at snooping, they could easily find out passwords
of peers and pass them along. Or something as simple as downloading known
contaminated software could be accomplished.
Physical access to a system must be controlled. By allowing virtually unlimited
access to systems throughout a company, or even a work center, this might allow an
untrustworthy employee an advantage that is unnecessary. Many government jobs
require different levels of access to systems. Control of access is essential to ensure that
higher levels of access are not inadvertently given to lower level employees.
E. COUNTERMEASURES
1. Objectives [Ref. 6]
• Set limits and enforce them.
• Hold individuals accountable for their actions.
• Review audit logs religiously—more frequently for personnel with higher
accesses.
• Make your system more resistant to sophisticated attacks by insiders.
• Use intrusion detection methods to detect access to sensitive information by
unauthorized personnel.
• Perform damage assessments, localize damage, and recover in the event of a
system security policy violation.
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2. Access Control
The following are some of the most important characteristics that need to be
addressed in order to implement effective technical access control:
• Access control criteria - a clear policy must be established and promulgated to
all users to guide those managing accounts and granting access.
• Access control lists - provides a list at each workstation of all personnel
authorized access.
• Access control tools - allows entry and maintenance of access control lists.
3. Identification and Authentication
In order to ensure that only authorized users gain access, you should use access-
granting tools that will positively identify the user. This involves obtaining the users
"claimed" identity followed by forcing the user to authenticate his identity. The simplest
form of this is the typical login identification and password. Other forms include smart
cards, retinal scanners, voice recognition, and signature recognition to name a few.
4. Encryption
After a user is authenticated and requests data, the unencrypted transmission may
be intercepted by sniffers placed there by malicious insiders. Sensitive data transmitted
on the network should be encrypted to prevent those without the need-to-know from
intercepting and using in an unacceptable manner. Sensitive files should be encrypted as
well to prevent someone from reading, even though they have gained access—no
encryption key, no ability to read.
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5. Operating System Controls and Administration Tools
The operating system plays a primary role in enforcing security policy and access
control. Great care should be taken to ensure that all known holes are plugged and that
appropriate settings are made to ensure security policies are enforced. Systems
Administrators should be carefully selected and highly skilled. They are tasked with
ensuring security policies are enforced and must be kept up-to-date in security
information. For this reason, systems administration should be a full-time job and not an
additional duty. Their knowledge should include the availability and use of network
vulnerability scanner, such as SATAN, they aids in the discovery of holes in your system
security.
6. Auditing and Logging
It is absolutely essential to keep logs of suspicious activities. Logging features of
operating systems should be turned on and set to the highest level of performance
possible without hindering operations too much. Audits on the logs should be performed
regularly to search for suspicious activities. This is a manpower intensive job. Software
packages exist today that will aid in this effort thus reducing the manpower needed and
will compile profiles of individual usage patterns and behaviors on the network. These
sophisticated packages will automatically scan large amounts of data and notify system
monitors of suspicious activity.
7. Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection packages monitor transactions at the network layer. The
monitor events based on source and destination addresses and protocol types. These
detection tools will identify signatures of known attack scenarios and behavior patterns.
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Although designed as a backup to firewalls in the detection of intruders on the network,
they will also double in the detection of suspicious activity by insiders as well. The best
intrusion detection tools available can respond fast enough to shut down specific ports or
the entire system in order to prevent further damage.
8. Firewalls
Firewalls normally prevent outsiders from intruding onto your networks. They
may also be used within an organization to separate different departments thus adding in
the protection of information from those without the need-to-know. These internal
firewalls also aid in the prevention of spreading viruses within an organization.
The following table is provided as an aid to support objectives.
Objectives Technical Countermeasures to the Insider Threat
ACCCIS
Control
























• • • •
Recovery
• • • •
Table 3.1. Mechanisms to Support Objectives. From Ref. [6].
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F. SUMMARY
Threats to computer systems can come for many sources. Chapter II discussed
various external threats that can be costly to computer systems. However, the internal
threat is just as real and can have a catastrophic effect on an organization. Insiders are
legitimate computer users. They already have access to the organization's computer
system and can use their knowledge to bypass security measures. The insider threat can
come from many sources including; spies, disgruntled employees, comprised or coerced
employees, former employees, or vendors/contractors. This threat is not limited to
personnel who knowingly violate security measures; it can be an employee who has not
been sufficiently trained in proper security protocol or simply a careless user. The lack of
checks and controls provide an untrustworthy insider the freedom to remove sensitive
information from networks. Many countermeasures have been developed that force the
employee to follow the organization's computer security policy. Access control,
identification and authentication, encryption, operating system controls, auditing,




A. WHAT IS PROFILING?
Profiling is the art of taking facts about an activity, storing these facts in a
database, and attempting to gain some conclusions based on frequencies of occurrence to
determine if an event is normal behavior or unexpected behavior within a particular
context through the use of automated statistical analysis. The automated analysis is used
to perform a check of audit logs. These audit logs can grow quite large and rapidly
depending on the frequency with which events, within a network are logged.
B. USES
Profiling is used in a wide spectrum of applications domains.
1. Criminology
a. Racial
Racial profiling has gained a considerable amount of attention. There is
much debate on whether this form of profiling actually exists or just appears to exist. It
primarily concerns law enforcement officers detaining anyone based on the suspect's
appearance. Why do this? It is difficult to ascertain if an individual is a criminal or not
based on their skin color alone. However, there is a type of appearance that can lead one
to believe a person might be a criminal or up to malicious mischief. Criminals are
generally people that fail to adhere to a norm. Law-abiding citizens tend to dress as well
as their social status will allow or better. They attempt to speak without using vile
language in public, and they maintain a clean, fresh look such as a nice haircut and
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recently bathed. This is a norm that has been well established for many years. While it is
true that someone may not be a criminal just because they are not well maintained in
appearance, a sampling of a criminal population, especially criminals on the lower end of
society, would reveal that many fit outside the norm. So is it fair to detain someone
based on their appearance? That is up to the standards set by laws.
b. Investigative
There is no established date when profiling criminals first began, but the
practice has been used for many years. Arthur Conan Doyle's Sherlock Holmes could
profile someone with a glance. Today, behavioral specialists study similarities in
criminal activity. They gather information about the criminal's early childhood,
scholastic achievements, parental guidance, to name a few, in order to determine patterns
in someone's past that might lead to a life of crime. Through gathering this information
on the past of known criminals and developing statistics, it may be determined with some
precision, if a person that has not yet committed a crime, may become a criminal in the
future. This type of profiling is further carried out on the basis of the type of crime.
Profiling is highly useful in tracking down serial criminals such as serial killers. The
criminal's methods of killing, clues that may have been left behind (accidentally or
intentionally), and information about the victims themselves may all be used to develop a
profile on the criminal. If an accurate profile can be developed, this greatly aids in the
capture and prosecution of the killer.
2. Meteorology
Dating back to the 1800's and perhaps earlier, weather data has been recorded.
Today large databases hold various weather data such as temperature, wind speed and
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direction, precipitation, dew point, and humidity. Statistical analyses are performed to
characterize nominal and extreme weather conditions.
Data is also collected from the ocean. The oceans, which cover over 70 percent
of the earth's surface, greatly influence climates around the globe. Therefore it is
important to study and understand the ocean and its influence on climate. Vertical
profiling instruments play an important role in oceanography and are used to support the
research in physical, chemical, and biological oceanography. The LEO- 15 vertical
profiler, operated by Rutgers University Institute of Marine and Coastal Science and
deployed off the coast ofNew Jersey in 15 meters of water, includes sensors to measure
chemical, optical, physical, and biological properties. As of 1997, its sensors are capable
of measuring temperature, conductivity, pressure, dissolved oxygen, fluoride,
transmissivity, optical backscatter, and photosynthetic active radiation. This data is
stored and norms are determined. By monitoring this data, this system is aiding scientists
in better understanding the coastal environment. These profiling systems greatly increase
the ability of oceanographers to interpret oceanographic data which has been collected
and stored. [Ref. 7]
3. Data Mining
Data mining has numerous applications. One such application deals with grocery
stores. These stores issue discount cards. These discount cards, unbeknownst to many,
are used to collect information on consumer buying habits. The consumer purchases
groceries. As the groceries are tallied at the cash register, this information is stored in a
computer. With the swipe of a card, the consumer's name is attached to the data. This
information is sometimes sold to various companies that market other consumer goods.
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The raw data is processed which develops a statistical profile of each individual. From
this profile, companies determine which products a specific consumer will be most likely
to buy, and tailor advertising and marketing promotions accordingly.
4. Example: Internet-Based Profiling
A form of data mining is also performed through the use of "cookies." A cookie
is a few lines of information sent by a web server to store on a web browser so it can be
retrieved from the browser later. Cookies are stored on the client machine and can only
be deciphered by the server that set the cookie. Both Microsoft and Netscape web
browsers use cookies to record user preferences for personal start pages. Cookies are
used for.online ordering systems, site personalization, web site tracking, target marketing,
and user identification. Online ordering systems set cookies to remember what a person
wants to buy, has bought, or is about to buy (what is in the "shopping cart"). For
example, United Airlines uses cookies to store personal information about customers who
make airline reservations via their web site. The cookie provides a convenient service to
the customer because all the personal information is stored on the user's hard drive. The
customer will not have to re-enter information the next time they return to the web site.
C. APPLICATIONS IN COMPUTER SECURITY
1. Software Profiling
Profiling does have some application in computer technology. One use of
profiling is in memory management. An operating system attempts to determine which
pages of a computer program are used the most. Then it will maintain these pages in
RAM or cache for fast retrieval.
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Another use can be found in the area of software development. Software reuse is
the process of building new software systems from predefined software components.
Recognizing this, an effort has been made to profile software components for reuse. One
such effort has resulted in the Software Reuse System. [Ref. 8] This system consists of a
storage module which classifies and stores software modules, and a retrieval mechanism
that locates modules that programmers might want to use in a new project. The storage
module constructs profiles, calculates similarity values using profiles and similarity






Figure 4.1. Storage Module of the Software Reuse System. After Ref. [8].
Two types of profiles are used in this process—Object Profiles and Virtual
Profiles. The profile constructed from the software component is the Object Profile. A
software component is scanned for information. The information obtained to produce a
profile is the function name, function argument name, global variable name, local
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variable name, and comments. The Object Profile structure contains identifiers (of
components, functions, and variables), weights (of function and variable identifiers),
function pointer (which indicates the actual position of software components), and
informal description (derived from comments embedded in source code).
Currently the jury is out on what affect profiling is having on the development of
new software. However, it is believed that advances in software reuse via profiling will
greatly enhance the ability of software developers to produce software at a more rapid
pace than is possible without profiling. This in turn can lower the amount of resources
that must be expended to develop software. The figure below shows the phases
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Figure 4.2. Phases of a Reuse Program Creation Project. From Ref. [9].
Since the beginning of programming, although it has been acknowledged as
something that developers should do, software reuse has met with great resistance and
frequent failure when attempted to put into actual practice across an organization. Why?
The reasons why software reuse often fails to work in practice are just as obvious as the
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reasons why it is a good idea. Software developers and management have no difficulty
citing a countless number of reasons such as:
There is nothing to reuse.
There is no management commitment or support.
Reward and recognition programs are counter to reuse.
Cost of reuse is too high.
It is too time-consuming to find something to reuse and to understand it.
Code reuse is more trouble then it is worth.
Reuse is not a part of or even mentioned in current development methods.
Current tools do not support reuse.
Management is not convinced of the business value of reuse.
Developers do not like reuse except it involves their own or perhaps their team
members software.
Research on the topic of software reuse is ongoing. It is however, a current attempt to
use profiling as a means to improve work.
2. Audit Reduction
Trusted systems must maintain audit trails of system activity in order that actions
counter to policy may be traced back to the users of system resources. Even where foul
play is not suspected, audit trails can be useful in restoring data integrity following
innocent mistakes or failures of software. Unfortunately, if an audit trail is to be useful in
tracing back an event after the fact, it must at all times record many system events at a
fine level of detail. The result is a great volume of data, most of it uninteresting, which
must be generated and stored in the hope that, if a suspicious event takes place, the few
43
critical records will be present that are needed to trace the sequence of events leading up
to a violation of security or other policy.
The sheer size of typical audit trails gives rise to two problems:
• The expense of storing audit trails can be significant, so space-efficient storage
techniques must be developed.
• The audit trails must be processed somehow to provide security administrators
with only the information of interest rather than mountains of data.
Because audit records can be generated rapidly in real time—depending on step-time,
granularity of data, number of parameters, etc. The processing time required to address
both problems must also be minimal.
The two problems are interrelated. Compression techniques applied to reduce
storage expense may complicate the later processing of the trail. Conversely, the same
techniques used to condense low-level detail into concise information for the security
administrator can be used to reduce the information stored. This is a special example of a
lossy compression technique, one where the loss can be explicitly tailored according to
the needs of the security administrator.
A number of commercial-off-the-shelf products provide auditing capabilities and
include tools for the reduction/abstraction of audit trails. However, the system designers
generally make different decisions regarding what details should be recorded and
application tools tend to be specific to those systems. Therefore care must be taken when
choosing an audit reduction application to ensure it meets the needs of the system for
which it is intended.
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In deciding what details to record, designers take a calculated risk which is also
inherent whenever details are condensed into higher-level records to save storage. The
risk is that, when a suspicious event takes place, key details needed to reconstruct the
event may not have been retained. Deciding what best to include in audit trails to
minimize this risk is a goal of the Computer Operations, Audit, and Security Technology
(COAST) Audit Trails Format Group (of Purdue University) and closely related to the
work of this group.
The problem of processing audit trails automatically, to report only important
sequences of events, encompasses audit reduction, misuse detection, and intrusion
detection. To develop better and more general solutions requires reviewing multiple
systems, and the effort to develop improved tools is most justified if the tools can be
easily adapted to many systems. [Ref. 10] With distributed systems, a combination of
hardware and software components are connected via a network. Varying
software/hardware packages connected to a network may cause problems when
attempting to monitor a system. The Computer Misuse Detection System, discussed in
the next chapter, is capable of monitoring several different operating systems and
hardware components.
3. Misuse/Intrusion Detection
Misuse detection involves real-time auditing and analysis capable of detecting and
deterring computer misuse. Profiles are created over time for each user. A statistical
analysis is also performed on a periodic basis to establish baselines against which to
judge user behavior. By approximately 30 days, an average user should have developed a
profile detailed enough to perform meaningful checks. Profiles are developed by
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processing large amounts of audit data. This data may be processed in real-time or, by
batch method. Batch method is a means of checking the audit data automatically based
on a schedule such as once per month or every seven days. Of course the ability to check
the audit data at any time, "on demand," should be available to security personnel as well.
The Computer Misuse Detection System, developed by Science Applications
International Corporation (SAIC) and now marketed by ODS Networks, is just such a
system and will be discussed in the next chapter.
Another system called Secure-IT 2000 provides security control and management
of remote users wishing to access corporate networks via modems or ISDN. It monitors
and analyzes all system access activity and generates a range of management reports
from a comprehensive real-time event log and historical audit trails. Billing modules
provide extremely accurate costs of all calls made to the system within 1 second.
With Secure-IT 2000, each user can be individually profiled for the type of access
that is required such as: [Ref. 1 1]
• Passthrough: This option will allow the user, once authenticated, to passthrough
to a host device.
• Normal Dial-Back: ' Once authenticated, the user will be called back at a set
number from a modem or ISDN terminal adapter on a different telephone line.
Up to three preset dial-back locations can be profiled per user.
• Wild Dial-Back: Once authenticated the user is allowed to enter a telephone
number to which the system will make an outgoing call.
• Temporary Users: For temporary personnel such as contractors or consultants.
This facility allows the administrator to enter the date at which the access rights of
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a particular user will terminate. The system will automatically inhibit this user at
midnight on that day.
• Remote Console: For support staff who need to gain administrative access to the
master console. Once authenticated the technician is asked if he/she wants to
connect as the master console.
• Access Periods: Each user is allocated his own access period timetable. The
period is defined on a 7 day, 24 hour basis in blocks of 30 minutes.
• Access Grouping: Host ports can be configured into groups to form access
points to different services, that is, Local Area Network Access Server, Unix
Server, Terminal Server, etc. This means that user access to each individual host
port or host service can be easily controlled.
• Password Aging: For users of user id, and password access, password aging can
be enabled whereby the user is forced to change password after a set number of
days up to a maximum of 99 days. The same password cannot be used for twelve
occurrences of password changes.
• User Class: Each user can belong to one user class. This can then be used to
group users together for reporting purposes. Up to 99 user classes can be defined.
• Change Bands: This option sets a defined charge class for a telephone number.
This allows call costs to be calculated by the Secure-IT 2000 billing module. Up
to 99 charge bands are definable.
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D. MONITORS
Monitors are used to observe activities on a network. They observe performance,
collect performance statistics, analyze data, and display results. Some reasons to monitor
a system are: [Ref. 12]
• To find the frequently used segments of software and optimize performance.
• Measure resource utilization and locate performance bottlenecks.
• Tune a system/network.
• Characterize the workload and use this information for capacity planning and
creating test workloads.
• Find model parameters, validate models, and develop inputs for models.
Monitors are classified in several ways but three primary classifications are: 1)
hardware, 2) software, and 3) firmware. We will concentrate primarily on hardware and
software monitors.
1. Software Monitors
Monitoring operating systems, database management systems, networks, and
applications can be accomplished with software monitors. However, these monitors are
suitable only if the input rate is low. Input rate is the maximum frequency of events that
a monitor can correctly observe. Due to the monitor being a software program that is
running on the systems being monitored, the system may lose some speed. They




A hardware monitor is made up of separate pieces of equipment that are attached
to a system via probes. Virtually no resources of the system being monitored are used by
a hardware monitor as it only senses, via probes. The probability of introducing bugs
into the system is generally lower that for software monitors. These hardware monitors
consist of the following elements: [Ref. 12]
• Probes - used to observe signals at desired points in the system hardware.
• Counters - incremented whenever a particular event occurs.
• Logic Elements - Signals from many probes can be combined using AND,
. OR, and other logic gates. Combinations are used to indicate events that may
increment the counters.
• Comparators - can be used to compare counters or signal values with preset
values.
• Mapping Hardware - allows histograms of observed quantities to be
computed. Consists of multiple comparators and counters.
• Timer - used for time stamping or for triggering a sampling operation.
• Tape/Disk - for storage of collected data.
3. Hardware Versus Software
Should a hardware monitor or a software monitor be used? Several factors should
be considered. The first step in making such a decision is to consider what needs to be
measured. Hardware monitors can sense electrical signals on the busses and can
accurately record them. But it is difficult for these monitors to detect higher level
information such as queue lengths or current number of users unless the information is
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stored in a hardware register. On the other hand, software monitors can easily determine
the higher level information but cannot observe low-level events. Other considerations
are listed in the following table:
Criterion Hardware Monitor Software Monitor






Input Rate Sampling rates of 1 5 per
second possible.
Sampling rate limited by the
processor MIPS and
overhead required.
















Monitor overhead None Overhead depends upon the
input rate and input width.
Portability Generally portable. Specific to an operating
system.





Errors Possible to connect the
probes to wrong points.
Once debugged, errors are
rare.
Cost High Medium
Table 4.1. Comparison of Hardware and Software Monitors. From Ref. [12].
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4. Distributed-System Monitors
The majority of computer systems today are distributed and consist of many
hardware and software components the work together separately and concurrently. It is
more difficult to monitor distributed systems than it is to monitor centralized systems.
The monitor itself must be distributed and should consist of several components that
work separately and concurrently. Several layers make up these monitors. These layers
are: [Ref. 12]
• Observation - gathers raw data on individual components of the system.
• Collection - collects the data from the observers.
• Analysis - analyzes the data gathered by the collectors.
• Presentation - this component provides the human interface and produces
reports, displays, and alarms.
• Interpretation - the intelligent entity (human or expert system) that can make
meaningful interpretations of the data.
The console provides an interface to control the system parameters and states, while the
management module makes the decision to set or change system parameters or









Figure 4.3. Layered View of a Distributed-System Monitor. From Ref. [12].
In the next chapter, we describe the Computer Misuse Detection System (CMDS).
CMDS has all the capabilities of a distributed system monitor.
E. SUMMARY
Profiling is not new, and has been used in many fields other than computer
security management. Criminology, meteorology, and data mining all use some form of
profiling to accomplish specific goals.
Profiling is the art of determining a unique set of characteristics that identify a
type or category of person. In the computer security field, profiling is an electronic way
of determining the normal behavior of a user from statistical data. Once this data is
obtained, a normalized pattern of behavior can be produced. The user's current activity is
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then compared to the normal behavior to determine if any unusual activity has occurred.
Some specific applications are memory management, audit reduction, and intrusion
detection. Additionally, monitors are used to observe activities on a network. The three
primary classifications of monitors are software, hardware, and firmware.
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V. COMPUTER MISUSE DETECTION SYSTEM
A. INTRODUCTION
The commercial product Computer Misuse Detection System (CMDS) is intended
to help provide an integrated Information Security management strategy. [Ref. 13] An
integrated security plan consists of a set of enforcement policies, which define in detail
the plan, strategy, and tactics for each security situation. These policies may define
different stances for the same situation for sub-organizations or individual roles within an
overall plan, such as a Command Security Policy. The Information Security manager
must define a security stance that balances the need to maintain organizational security,
with the need for access as well as legal and political constraints.
CMDS performs analyses of computer system audit data and ancillary data to
automate the computer misuse detection process in networked data processing
environments. It detects security-relevant events that may constitute evidence of attacks
against information stored on, processed on, or transmitted by computers. The strength
ofCMDS is that it can gather and process audit log information from many platforms in a
timely manner and present it in an organized easy-to-use format. Its goal is to provide
the capability to process a wide range of security policies in an effective manner.
Networked computer environments consist of hardware platforms and software
operating systems and applications from a diverse set of manufacturers. Many operating
systems and software applications are capable of producing some form of audit
information. This information normally has little consistency in format from one source
to the next. In addition, audit data collection tends to operate at a low level of data
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abstraction. This results in tremendous amounts of data being collected, which are
impractical to analyze using manual methods. Depending on the level of auditing that is
enabled, a software package may be capable of capturing a level of detail almost down to
a keystroke.
Additionally, making sense of audit information may require access to ancillary
data sources outside of the audit data trail, such as mapping of IP addresses to host
names, or user ID's and platforms to user names. The format of audit information may
also be very diverse consisting of a variety of ASCII file formats or binary formats such
as array or database formats.
CMDS provides a tailored set of processing engines to reduce the analysis effort,
and an advanced GUI interface for reporting, status, and configuration.
The process of detecting security-relevant events is dependent on having a
knowledge of the patterns of evidence which constitute the events. A defined pattern of
evidence is called an event signature. Event detection is a pattern matching process.
Sequence-dependent events may require multiple passes through the data for complete
signature identification.
The use of multiple methods, or engines, for signature detection presents some
data management problems in a distributed environment. It is advantageous to
standardize data as early in the process as possible, so that the minimum number of
passes can be made for signature detection, and engines can be generalized. CMDS
events are of two basic types - primary and derived. Primary events can be obtained
solely by reference to a single entry in the original audit source. Derived events are
obtained by applying more complex process rules to primary events. These events may
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be entered into the database either by updating fields in pre-existing Event Record, or by
creating a new Event Record based on rules applied from a variety of sequential
processing engines.
All CMDS events are derived from some form of audit evidence. In other words,
they can be mapped back to primary data obtained from the original audit source(s), or
from a combination of audit source information, local information, or historical profile
(statistical) data.
B. HOW CMDS WORKS?
CMDS is based on a "client-server" architecture. It reads audit data from client
machines (called "targets" or "agents") and sends the information to the server machine to
help detect deviations from expected behavior, adherence to predefined threat behavior,
and suspicious trends in all system activity. [Ref. 13]
The CMDS server collects and reduces large numbers of audit records on
heterogeneous networks. (Figure 5.1 provide an example ofCMDS running on a
heterogeneous network.) An audit record consists of sequential, discrete data elements
that indicate an action has taken place. It gathers data from any supported target audit
data source through a target daemon where the data is parsed into a common format,
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Figure 5.1. CMDS Operating on a Heterogeneous Network. From Ref. [13].
CMDS processes data in three different modes: Real-Time, Batch, and On-
Demand.
• Real-Time: Audit records are processed as they are created at the target source.
See Figure 5.2.
• Batch: Audit records are processed at per-specified times in groups (files).
• On Demand: One audit record is processed at the request of the operator.
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Figure 5.2. Real-Time Processing. From Ref. [13].
1. Real-Time Processing
The target daemon runs continuously on each target in the real-time environment.
It reads the current audit files and sends the audit data to the real-time server. The.data is
then sent from the target daemon to the server in buffers of 5 to 999 records. [Ref. 13]
2. Batch Processing
This mode is used to reduce network overhead during peak hours of operation, or
if you need to isolate the CMDS Server machine from the rest of the network. Audit files
are sent from the target machine to the server machine's batch processing area on a
periodic basis.
3. On-Demand Processing
This mode provides a special type of audit data processing. It enables the user to
select a specific audit file to be processed individually. Typically, it would be used to
process a data file that was created before CMDS was installed; to reprocess a data file,
possibly with new configuration parameters; or for targets that do not have a direct
connection to the CMDS server machine.
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4. Server Operation
The server software reduces data through statistical and rule-based methods and
outputs both real-time alerts and graphical reports. [Ref. 13] It uses attack signatures,




























Figure 5.3. Sample CMDS System Overview. From Ref. [13].
Computer audit records are generated from a number of sources including
operating system audits, application audits, database audits, and network management
audits. CMDS uses audit records from the operating system and firewalls. Typically, all
audit records, regardless of source, contain an event number user identification, time
stamp, and object (filename). CMDS uses this information to create its own unique audit
record format from records gathered across many target audit sources.
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C. GRAPHICAL USER INTERFACE
CMDS incorporates a Motif-based graphical user interface (GUI) that provides a
user-friendly interface. Once CMDS is properly configured, a user can perform almost
all of the program's operations through these GUIs. The Control Window (Figure 5.4),












Start Server: 'cmds' - License
expires for this server 1 2/31 /2037
12:00:00
m
Figure 5.4. CMDS Control Window. From Ref. [13].
1. Starting CMDS Servers
This section describes how to start and use CMDS Servers to process data from
single or multiple servers.
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Figure 5.5. The CMDS Servers Window. From Ref. [13].
To gain access to the CMDS Servers window, click on the Servers button on the
CMDS Control Window. The CMDS Servers window, shown in Figure 5.5 will appear
on your screen. The following information is contained on the Servers window: [Ref. 13]
• Servers: Lists the name of each CMDS server that is configured to start.
• Zone #: This is a unique number in which CMDS identifies each server. The
target daemon uses the zone number to know with which server to connect.
• Audit Type: Lists the audit type.
• Server Type: REAL-TIME, BATCH, or ON-DEMAND.
• Start: Starts the server you have selected.
• Done: Closes the CMDS Servers window.
To begin, select the CMDS server or servers you want to start then click on the
Start button to bring up the Server Control and Alert List windows. The Starting server
<server name> message will appear. For each server you select, a Server Control
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window and an Alert List window will appear. Figure 5.6 shows the Server Control
window. When a target daemon begins collecting audit data for the server, the names of
targets being monitored appear in the left-hand column of this window. The target name
will blink to indicate that the CMDS server is currently receiving data from that particular
target.












Figure 5.6. The Server Control Window. From Ref. [13].
To view a list of users for a particular target, click on the target name. A user list
for that target will appear in the right-hand column.
To use the Guiless Server feature, click on the Run In Background button. A
dialog box (Figure 5.7) will appear asking if you want to put the Server in the
background. In Guiless Server mode, alert and warning boxes are not displayed, but alert
and warning information is stored for future retrieval.
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Figure 5.7. The Background Server Dialog Box. From Ref. [13].
Select the Stop Server button to stop the server and close the Server Control window.
[Ref. 13]
2. Real-Time Servers
Real-time servers are used to monitor critical targets in a timely manner. From
the Server Control window, follow these steps to access the Monitor window:
Select the target name to view the users associated with a specific target. The users field
contains names of users who have had an audit record created with their user ID since
midnight of the current day. [Ref. 13]
Select the user's name to obtain information about his or her activity during the
current session or during the historical data period. The Monitor window will appear as
shown in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9. You can view multiple Monitor windows
simultaneously by selecting the names of users whose activity you want to monitor.
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Monitor - woll'Ssouthpark
Tue Feb 10 11:05:55 1998
22 (24814), Object: /etc/fsck
Tue Feb 1011 :0554 1 998
23 (24814), Object: Ajsrfbin/ls
Tue Feb 10 11:0554 1998
25 (24809)
Listing the last 5 execution
record(s) found:
Tue Feb 10 11:05:271998
object: /usr/bin/su
Tue Feb 10 11:05:25 1998
object: /./usr/bin/niail
Tue Feb 10 11:0525 1998
object: /Jusribin/cat
Tue Feb 1011 :05:24 1 998
Figure 5.8. The Monitor Window. From Ref. [13].
Each Monitor window displays an image of the user along with raw audit data the
user is currently generating. You can scan user images into the computer and store them
in the CMDS_DIR/images file in .gif format. The .gif file name needs to be the same as
the user name in order for the image to appear correctly. If the user's image is not
available, the CMDS default image appears, as in Figure 5.9.
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Monitor - wolldsoutl^ark
Tue Feb 1 1 1 :05:55 1 338
22 (24814), Object: /etc/fsck
Tue Feb 10 11:05:541938
23 (2481 4), Object: AisrfblrWls
Tue Feb 10 11:05:541936
25(24803)
Listing the last 5 execution
record (s) found:
Tue Feb 10 11:05:27 1338
object: /usr/bin/su
Tue Feb 1 1 1 :05:25 1338
object: /./usr/binAnaH
Tue Feb 10 11:05:25 1338
object: /./Usr/bin/cat
Tue Feb 1011 :05:24 1338
Figure 5.9. The Monitor Window with the Default Image. From Ref. [13].
The five options (Current Activity, Historical Activity, Line Graph, Bar Graph,
Done) and the corresponding windows are discussed in the following sections.
a. Current Activity Window
The Current Activity window, shown in Figure 5.10, provides a real-time
statistical representation of the user's behavior during the current session. The caption
header displays the user (davee) and the hostname (October). The current session begins
with the first record generated after midnight and ends the following midnight.
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Current Activity - da.vee@october
First AR Time: jThu Mar 5 09:47:44 1 998
Last AR Time: |Thu Mar 5 09:53:07 1 998













Last Audit Record: 22 (221 88), Object: /etc/termcap
Done
Figure 5.10. The Current Activity Window. From Ref. [13].
The Current Activity window displays the following data: [Ref. 13]
• First AR Time: The date and time the user generated the first audit record
after midnight.
• Last AR Time: The last time the user generated an audit record up to and
including midnight.
• Time Connected: The amount of time in hours and minutes the user has been
active during the current session. This is the amount of time between First
AR Time and Last AR Time.
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• Total Audit Records: The number of audit records the user has generated
since midnight.
• Category Audit Records: The number of audit records generated in each
statistical category, and the percentage of these records versus the total
number of records generated during the current session.
• Last Audit Record: The last CMDS (normalized) event number, the process
ID (in parenthesis), and the object. The object is the last audit record found.
• Done: Closes the Current Activity window.
b. Historical Activity Window
The Historical Activity window, shown in Figure 5.1 1, provides statistical
information when data for more than one day is found. The default historical data period
is 90 sequential days, which includes the day before the current date. The user has the
ability to configure this time period.
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Historical Activity - cmds©octob«r
Historical From: |Tue Feb 3 09:47:02 1998
Daily Profiles: \z~ Alerts: |o" Warnings: [570
Average Number of Hours Each Day of the Week
MON TUE WED THU FRI SAT SUN
Day r or or o r . o r o r .. o i
Night I L I 1 j : | |
Average Session Length: jo hrs 5 min
Avg Records/Day 5782












Figure 5.1 1. The Historical Activity Window. From Ref. [13].
The Historical Activity window displays the following data: [Ref. 13]
• Historical From: The start date and time of the historical data period.
• Daily Profiles: The number of days the user cmds@october has been logged
in during the historical data period.
• Alerts: The number of alerts generated by the user cmds@october during the
historical data period.
• Warnings: The number of warnings generated by the user cmds@october
during the historical data period.
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• Average Number of Hours Each Day of the Week: The average number of
hours of user activity during the day and night for each day of the week during
the historical period. This time is calculated by taking the average between
the First AR Time and the Last AR Time for each day.
• Average Session Length: The average length of the user's sessions during
the historical data period. This is a calculation of the time between First AR
Time and Last AR Time.
• Avg Records/Day: The average number of audit records generated for each
day cmds@october had activity during the historical data period.
• Audit Records: Contains a scrollable list of the statistical category audit
records. Read across for average, threshold, percentage, and tolerance range
statistics for each statistical category.
• Avg/Day: This field displays, for each statistical category, the average
number of audit records generated for each day the user is logged in during
the historical data period.
• Threshold: This field displays, for each statistical category, the threshold,
which is the average per day plus the standard deviation of the historical data
period.
• Avg%: This field displays, for each statistical category, the average
percentage of records in the historical data period.
• Tolerance Range%: This field displays, for each statistical category, the
percentage range, which is the average percentage of plus and minus the
standard deviation percentage of the historical data period.
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• Done: Closes the Historical Activity window.
c. Tolerance Line Graph Window
The Tolerance Line Graph window, shown in Figure 5.12, provides a real-
time statistical representation of the deviation of current behavior from historical
behavior in line graph form for each category of audit record generated. The name of the
user and target appears at the top of the window.
\\ Tolerance Line Graph - daveeOoctober











Figure 5.12. The Tolerance Line Graph Window. From Ref. [13].
The Tolerance Line Graph window displays the following data for each statistical
category: [Ref. 13]
• Lines: The solid aquamarine line shows data from the current session, in real
time. The solid green line shows the expected percentage of category audit
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records generated. The broken red and yellow lines show the expected
percentage plus and minus the standard deviation. Red indicates the upper
limit, and yellow indicates the lower limit of the expected values.
• Percentages: The Tolerance Line Graph window displays the following for
each statistical category.
• Statistical category: The percentage of audit records, by specific category,
generated during the current session.
• Expected: The mean percentage of audit records, by specific category,
generated from the user's historical data.
• Acceptable: Lists the range of percentage of audit records, by specific
category, generated from the user's historical data.
• Done: Closes the Tolerance Line Graph window.
d. Behavior Bar Graph Window
The Behavior Bar Graph window, shown in Figure 5.13, provides a real-
time representation of the number of audit records in a category as part of the total




The green bar shows the number of statistical category audit records
generated on the current day.
2. The blue bar shows the average number of statistical category audit
records generated per day.
3. The orange bar shows the threshold number of statistical category
audit records.
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4. The green bar turns red when the number of statistical category audit
records has exceeded the threshold.
• Numbers: The Behavior Bar Graph window shows the following data for
each statistical category:
• Above the green bar: The number of audit records found.
• Below the orange bar: The threshold value. CMDS places the threshold
value for each category two-thirds of the distance along the bar. Notice that
each statistical category bar has its own scale, depending on its threshold
value.
• Done: Closes the Behavior Bar Graph window.
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Figure 5.13. The Behavior Bar Graph Window. From Ref. [13].
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D. ALERTS AND WARNINGS
CMDS generates alerts and warnings when a network user's behavior matches a
predefined threat signature. Each target displays alerts in an Alert List window, shown in
Figure 5.14. This window will appear on the screen when you start a CMDS target. If
you are in real-time mode, alerts are displayed in real-time. If you are in batch or on-
demand mode, alerts will display when processed. The most recent alerts appear in the
foreground. The alert time, shown in the window, is the time of the event that caused the
alert. If you select the Hide button to remove the Alert List window from your screen,
the window will reappear as soon as the next alert occurs.
Note: In guiless mode, alerts and warnings are not displayed, but are saved in the
CMDS database for future retrieval. [Ref. 13]
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Figure 5.14. The Alert List Window. From Ref. [13].
When CMDS detects an alert, the red CMDS Alert window, shown in Figure
5.15, will pop up on your screen. The alert window will not automatically refresh, it
remain on the screen until the user manually clears it. While the Alert List window
allows you to view the sequence of alerts, the CMDS Alert window enables you to
respond to a specific alert.
A scrollable box in the upper portion of the CMDS Alert window displays the
alert message. The window contains the following fields: [Ref. 13]
• User Name: Name of the user who generated the alert
• Target: Name of the target machine
• Process ID: Process ID number
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• Code: This field is for future use as a priority number for alerts
• Time: Date and time of the event that caused the alert
CMOS Alert
"FailedSu" by kurt on romeo at Mon Sep 14
15:02:47 1998







Figure 5.15. CMDS Alert Window. From Ref. [13].
The current version ofCMDS only provides two ways to respond to an alert.
Simply select the action you want to take. [Ref. 13]
• Ignore: Closes the CMDS Alert window.
• Increased Observation: In real-time mode, this option allows you to view the
CMDS Monitor window. This enables you to see the user's current activity,
historical activity, a line graph, or a bar graph.
• Denial of Access : (Not implemented in V3 . 5 . 1
.)
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• Emergency-SHUTDOWN: (Not implemented in V3.5. 1
.)
A complete list ofCMDS Alerts and Warnings for all systems is contained in
Appendix A.
E. NETWORK REPORTS
CMDS also has the ability to present trending data in graphs and charts. Trending
information is presented graphically to make it easier to identify patterns in the data. For
example, the trending reports can identify when a user starts to work non-duty hours. If a
user suddenly starts to work many non-duty hours, a graph will reveal this activity.
Network Reports display alphanumeric and bar graph information in an easy-to-
read format. This allows you to design your network reports by selecting from a variety
of options, including report type, report output, report range, audit type, top ten list, alerts
and warnings, and single, or multiple targets and users. [Ref.13] To gain access the
Network Reports window, go to the CMDS Control Window and select Network Reports.
The Network Reports window will appear on the screen as shown in Figure 5.16.
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Network Reports
RnlrievH Targets and LJsHrs..
Report Type:
Rep cit Output:
I llstorlc J (cc^mindd)
Slart; IMHVUI
t Daily (f«Vifmifld<J):







Ignore Case All Turfjcls
Lint iDlrivril •« - V/t* F* U 17:*S,3 1 1 DM
• Real-Timea'Batch ReiMR Oii-Demarnl Reooft
Figure 15.6. The CMDS Network Reports Window. From Ref. [13].
Reports can display audit data by user, by target, by date, or by hour. You can use
a search string to filter alerts and warnings. CMDS searches for the string you enter and
produces a report with all occurrences of alerts and warnings containing that string. For
example, the Security Administrator can use this capability to obtain a report of critical
files accessed or a report of users who changed their privilege level. The report header
identifies the search string.
The Network Reports window contains three sections. On the left side are the
following fields and buttons: [Ref. 13]
• Report Type: Determines whether the X axis of a bar chart in a network
report displays by user, by targets, by date, or by hour. The default display is
By User. Select Report Type to access a drop-down menu with the available
options. If you have selected the Daily Report option, the By Date option will
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not be available. The Report Type field also forms the basis for calculating
averages and sorting alerts and warnings.
• Report Output: Provides a drop-down menu with options to print a hard
copy of your report, view it on the screen with PS Viewer, or send it to a file.
The Report Output default is the PS Viewer (GhostView) option.
• Historical (CCYYMMDD): Specifies a period of time greater than one day.
This option requires you to enter data in the following fields:
• Start: The date for the first day of the report period in CCYYMMDD format.
• End: The date for the last day of the report period in CCYYMMDD format.
• Daily (CCYYMMDD): Used to choose a specific day for a report.-
• Day: The day in CCYYMMDD format.
The middle section of the CMDS Network Reports window displays the
following fields and buttons: [Ref. 13]
• Audit Type: Provides a drop-down menu that contains the target audit data
used to generate a report. To receive a summary list of alerts and warnings
generated by all applicable targets select All.
• List Top Ten: Generates a list of the ten users, targets, or dates that recorded
the greatest number of alerts and warnings during the report period. This list
will show the top ten users, targets, or dates, depending on your selection in
the Report Type field.
• Print Warnings: Generates a list of warnings.
• Print Alerts: Generates a list of alerts.
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• Search String - Alerts/Warnings: Enter a unique string of letters in this field
to select alerts and warnings of a certain type. For example, to generate a
report with an alerts and warnings list that includes only messages about
critical files, enter Critical. Select the Ignore Case option to make the search
string ignore upper and lower case designations.
• Ignore Case: Select the Ignore Case box to turn off case sensitivity. CMDS
will then search for the characters you enter, regardless of upper or lower
case.
The right section of the CMDS Network Report window lists the following
information: [Ref. 13]
• Retrieve Targets and Users: Refreshes the lists of targets and users. The
following messages appear when selected:
Retrieving Target and User datafrom the database. This may take a few
minutes, depending on size of data stored.
• Targets: Lists the targets of all the servers that CMDS has monitored data.
Select the target or targets from this list that contain audit data you want to
generate in a network report.
• Users: Lists all the users on all targets that CMDS has monitored data. Select
the user or users from this list that contain audit data you want to generate in
the network report.
• List retrieved on: Indicates by day of the week, month, date, hour, minute,
and seconds the last time CMDS updated the user and target lists.
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The bottom of the CMDS Network Reports window displays the following
fields and buttons: [Ref. 13]
• Printer or File Name: Enter a filename or printer name, depending on your
selection in the Report Output field.
• Real-Time/Batch Report: Select this option if you want the report to contain
target audit data processed in real-time or batch mode.
• On-Demand Report: Select this option if you want the report to contain
target audit data processed in on-demand mode.
• Generate: Select the Generate button to check on valid inputs and generate
the report. If you have entered valid data, the following message appears:
"Started Subprocessfor Network Reports "
F. CMDS PROFILES
CMDS offers the unique ability to generate specific profiles for specific users.
These profiles can be custom generated and are based on the user's name, target host
name, and dates. This feature allows the security administrator to perform either a
historical profile and/or a daily profile on a user's behavior.
1. Historical Profiles
To generate a historical profile of a user's behavior, select the Historical Profile
button on the Control Window. The Historical Profile window will appear as shown in
Figure 5.17.
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Figure 5.17. The CMDS Historical Profile Window. From Ref. [13].
The period of time between the start and end dates defines the historical data
period. This period can include data as old as the date of the first audit record and as
current as today's date. However, note that if the servers are running, the statistical data
for the current day may not have been written to disk yet. Therefore, the report may not
be current.
The Historical Profile window contains the following fields and buttons:
83
• User Name: The user you want to generate the historical profile.
• Target Name: The target host from where you want to extract the historical
profile data.
• Start Date (CCYYMMDD): Start date of the historical data period.
• End Date (CCYYMMDD): End date of the historical data period.
• Generate: Generates the historical profile.
The WARNINGS/ALERTS DATA TOTALS section contains the following
fields: [Ref.13]
• Alerts: Displays the number of alerts generated during the historical data
period.
• Warnings: Displays the number of warnings generated during the historical
data period.
The DAILY DATA AVERAGES (HRS) section displays the following fields
categorized under Weekday Data (Monday through Friday) and Weekend Data (Saturday
and Sunday): [Ref. 13]
• Day: Shows the average number of hours of a user's activity for each day of
the week during the historical data period. The CMDS day is from 8:00 a.m.
to 4:59 p.m.
• Night: Shows the average number of hours of a user's activity for each night
of the week during the historical data period. The CMDS night includes the
times from midnight through 7:59 a.m. and from 5:00 p.m. through 1 1 :59 p.m.
• Total: Lists the total hours, day and night, for each day of the week during the
historical period.
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• Length: Displays the average length of the user's sessions for each day of the
week during the historical data period.
The COMMAND DATA section contains the following fields presented in table
format for each statistical category: [Ref.13]
• Avg/Day: Displays the average number of audit records generated for each
day the user is logged in during the historical data period.
• Threshold: Displays the threshold, which is the average per day plus the
standard deviation of the historical data period.
• Avg%: Displays the average percentage of a record during the historical data
period.
• Tolerance Range%: Displays the percentage range, which is the average
percentage of plus and minus the standard deviation percentage of a record for
the historical data period.
• Done: Closes the Historical Profile window.
If you enter invalid data, CMDS will notify you with an error message. Error
messages and causes are listed in Appendix B.
2. Daily Profiles
CMDS provides a system administrator with the ability to generate a profile based
on a user's behavior on a particular day. The Daily Profile window will appear (Figure
5.18) when selecting the Daily Profile button on the Control Window. The period of time
between the start and end dates defines the data period. It can include data as old as the
date of the first audit record and as current as today's date. If the servers are running, the
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statistical data for the current day may not have been written to disk yet and the report
may not be accurate.
CMDS Daily Profile
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Figure 5.18. The Daily Profile Window. From Ref. [13].
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The Daily Profile window contains the following fields and buttons: [Ref. 13]
• User Name: The daily profile of the user you want to generate.
• Target Name: The target host from where you want to extract daily profile
data.
• Date(CCYYMMDD): The date for the daily profile you want to generate.
• Generate: Select the Generate button to create the profile.
CMDS displays daily profile data in the following fields: [Ref. 13]
• Start Time: Displays the time the user generated the first audit record on the
given date.
• End Time: Displays the last time the user generated an audit record on the
given date.
• Total Time: Shows the amount of time in hours and minutes between Start
Time and End Time.
• Total Audit Records: Lists the number of audit records the user has
generated since midnight.
• Category Audit Records: Displays audit records generated by category and
the percentage of these records versus the total number of records.
• Alert Data: Lists all alert data generated by user name, date/time, and
message.
• Warning Data: Lists all warning data generated by user name, date/time, and
message.
• Done: Closes the Daily Profile window.
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If you enter invalid data, CMDS will notify you with an error message.
G. TAILORING CMDS
For maximum flexibility, the CMDS Server uses an expert system to detect attack
signatures. It can configure the system to define new alerts and warnings. C Language
Production System (CLIPS) is an expert system tool, which provides a complete
environment for the construction of rule and/or object-based expert systems.
Defining new alerts and warnings with CLIPS is a three-step process. [Ref. 13]
• Understand the attack signature of the new behavior that will generate the
alert or warning.
• Define the facts, or data, that will be extracted from the incoming audit data
and make the facts available to the expert system through the event/acts file.
• Write the rules that recognize the attack signature pattern in the incoming data
in the constructs.clp file.
1. Attack Signatures
Attack signatures are patterns found in audit records that indicate potential
misuse. A good example of this concept is a Trojan horse, which is a destructive
program that masquerades as a benign application. Unlike a virus, Trojan horses do not
replicate themselves but they can be just as destructive. One of the most insidious types
of Trojan horse is a program that claims to rid your computer of viruses but instead
introduces viruses onto your computer. Detecting Trojan horses is critical to maintaining
a secure network of computers. Because there is no clear definition of a Trojan horse, the
CMDS server does not detect Trojan horses directly. Instead, it detects attack signatures
that indicate Trojan horse activity.
One indication of Trojan horse activity is a privilege upgrade because processes
seeking to do harm typically need to have expanded privileges to get to critical system
files. This behavior is unique to Trojan horses because most processes needed by
everyday users do not require expanded privilege. Privilege upgrade is therefore a good
candidate for an attack signature.
2. Defining Facts
Facts are discrete pieces of information made available to the expert system that
are processed for patterns of misuse behavior. An attack signature may be present in a
single fact or a set of facts. The facts are maintained in the CMDS fact base, which is
built by "asserting" facts through the eventfacts file. You can configure the server to
assert facts based on specific CMDS record types. Each record processed that matches a
number in the eventfacts file will be asserted as a fact in the CMDS attack signature fact
base.
3. Writing Rules
The CMDS CLIPS Rule Base manipulates these facts, which you can configure
based on your system-specific needs. Rule-based programming is one of the most
commonly used techniques for developing expert systems. A rule contains an //"portion
and a then portion. The //"portion is a series of patterns specifying the facts or data which
cause the rule to be applicable. The then portion of a rule is a specific set of actions that
are executed when the rule is applicable. Rules define the patterns of attack signatures
and the text displayed in the alert boxes and summary reports.
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H. SUMMARY
The Computer Misuse Detection System (CMDS) is designed to provide
organizations with a monitoring capability that can be used to enforce a computer
security policy. The power ofCMDS comes from its ability to process large amounts of
raw audit log information from many different sources, including Windows NT, UNIX
,
SUN/SOLARIS, TRUSTED SOLARIS, and RAPTOR. The compiled information is
then presented in a user-friendly format. CMDS can be configured to process data in
three different modes, Real-Time, Batch, or On-Demand, and allows an organization to
set-up CMDS based on their individual requirements.
The processed data can be displayed in various forms, depending on the needs of
the administrator. For example, a user's current activities can be monitored or a historical
account of his or her activities can be displayed. Some other features ofCMDS include,
the ability to generate network reports, historical profiles, and daily profiles.
Additionally, predefined warnings and alerts will pop up on the administrator's screen
indicating potential wrong-doing. Another significant advantage of CMDS, is its ability
to be modified to fit into any organization's computer security policy. CLIPS is an expert




Computer systems are an essential part of all organizations. In order to ensure
that these computer systems are used in a proper and effective manor, it is critical that a
formal set of acceptable standards be established. System administrators and users
should be aware of these standards and regularly trained on computer security issues. A
set of acceptable standards for computer system use can best be implemented through a
well-defined computer security policy.
A computer security policy is a formal document that defines rules and principles
that affect the way an organization approaches computer security related problems.
Additionally, it establishes agreed upon conditions for the use of the organizations
computer resources. The goal of a computer security policy is to prevent the loss of
information that is critical to an organization. Failure to follow these guidelines could
easily lead to such a loss, regardless of whether the security breach occurred as a result of
an act of god, hardware/software error, or malicious action, internal or external, to the
organization.
Computer security requirements can greatly vary from organization to
organization. It is important that each organization reviews its security requirements and
formulates its own computer security policy.
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B. PURPOSE OF A WRITTEN POLICY
There are many reasons to have a formal written policy. The most obvious of
which is "because we have to." [Ref. 14] Many organizations are bound by a set of
common practices that are reviewed or audited periodically for compliance. Government
organizations are no different, and in many cases require a more strict set of rules to
enforce national security issues. Written policies and procedures help assure that
employees consistently and properly carry out the work needed to manage an
organization.
Another significant reason for the development of a written policy is to help guide
the behavior of employees who are constantly faced with numerous decisions. This
applies to occupations such as physicians, accountants, lawyers, scientists and other
professionals that require a set of well-defined procedures in order to accomplish their
job. Once policy is in place, personnel that have been trained on the set of rules can be,
in theory, interchanged. With the constant turn over of personnel, the military relies on
these procedures to accomplish its mission. Every process, from how to operate a
engineering plant on a warship to pre-flight check list for pilots has a written set of
formal procedures that must be performed the same way every time to ensure the
completion of the mission and the safety of personnel.
Policies also allow for the smooth turnover of personnel. The military constantly
transfers people every few years. It is extremely important that the person taking over a
job can adequately and properly perform the assigned duties. Written policies are
invaluable tools that ensure the consistently and accuracy of the work being
accomplished.
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Policies must be flexible enough to allow for the ever-changing environment.
They must to incorporate a way of handling unique situations that might arise. Policies
that have a special way of dealing for changes can form a directory of operating
procedures used in irregular and unique situations. Additionally, they can describe
various special situations and provide a thought process for handling these situations.
While handling these unique situations is very important, it is also important to allow for
a feedback mechanism. A feedback mechanism would allow the policies and procedures
to be updated and thus the best procedures would be followed.
Finally, written policies form a critical component of the management philosophy.
They reflect intangible operations, management theories, and technical directives that are
produced in boardroom meetings. The written procedure contained in the policy ties the
abstract thought process to a solid work task. [Ref. 14] A directive must be converted
into a formal written policy statement that is clearly written, specific, and unambiguous.
The policy statement of any organization, especially as it relates to computer security
practices, is where the executive mentality is manifested into the daily organization
operations. [Ref 14]
C. TYPES OF POLICIES
The world is full ofmany organizations with many different needs when it comes
to computer security. While policies should be tailored to an organization specific need,
some general classifications of computer security policies have been developed. The
three general classifications are regulatory, advisory, and informative. It is important to
understand that while these three types of policies exist; no organization can properly
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function using just a single type of policy. Combinations of policies are often necessary
to handle the different levels of sensitive information that are contained within any
organization.
1. Regulatory
This type of policy is primarily for organizations that are not totally at liberty to
develop and carry out security policies. They are usually organizations that are
frequently held to close public scrutiny and operate in the public interest or public safety.
However, they could be organizations that are responsible for managing large amounts of
money for constituents such as brokerages, banks, or insurance companies. These
policies describe in great detail what is to be done, when it is to be done, and who is to do
it. [Ref. 14] It contains specific references to job function, transactions, and procedures
that are unique to a specific organization.
They are two reasons for establishing this type of computer security policy. The
first reason is to establish a clearly consistent process. This is very important for
organizations that are involved with the general public. Policies Must show uniformity in
the way regulations are carried out without prejudice. The second reason is to allow
individuals that are unfamiliar with the process to have confidence in those who are doing
the job.
While this type of policy touches on procedures in great detail, it does have a
down side. It is not very effective in situations where personnel are making judgements
based on the current facts and environment. An example would be the decision to send
an ambulance to a victim of an attack. The rescue squad, attempting to save a life, does
not have the time to follow an extensive process. Additionally, this policy would not be
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practical when the situation requires frequent variations from the prescribed method. A
regulatory policy that has too many exceptions is cumbersome, difficult to enforce, and
can lead to non-compliance of personnel who take exception to every rule.
2. Advisory
The primary objective of this type of policy is to give trained personnel the
opportunity to quickly and easily identify a standard course of action, while allowing
them the freedom to make judgement decisions when special situations arise. While an
advisory policy is not as rigorously enforced as a regulatory policy, the risk of not
following the policy is usually stated in the policy. This statement is an attempt to allow
personnel referencing the policy to make an informed decision based on the facts
surrounding the situation. When developing this type of policy it is important to consider
the risk involved. Some risk might include: [Ref. 14]
• Omitting information needed to make a valid decision.
• Failing to notify the appropriate decision-makers need to complete the
process.
• Missing important deadline or due dates.
• Lost time reviewing nonstandard processes.
This policy is only advisory in nature and an organization that is considering
using this type of policy must consider the risks and the experience level of its personnel.
It is conceivable that one organization might apply this policy to its most experience
personnel, while another might use it as a required policy. It could also apply to specific
types of procedures. For example, a policy may require two authorizing signatures to
obtain a password for changing a production computer program. It may be advisory
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under normal circumstances, but could be disregarded or replaced with an alternative
policy in the event of an absence of a key individual. This type of situation must be
described and identified within the policy so all personnel are aware of the deviation in
policy.
3. Informative
An informative policy is the least directive in nature and is one that simply .
informs the user. No actions are expected and no penalty of risk is imposed for not
following the policy. The overall goal of an informative policy is to inform as many
people as possible. While this type of policy is much less restrictive than a regulatory or
advisory policy, it often carries strong messages and delineates extremely severe
consequences. For example, it can state "future use of this system or process is restricted
to authorized individuals and violators will be prosecuted." This statement is informative
in nature. While authorized users will have no negative consequences to their actions, it
implies that unauthorized users that insist on ignoring the warning of the policy will have
severe consequences.
A major advantage of having an informative policy is that an organization can
have the policy widely distributed among its employees without the risk of sensitive
information being disclosed. The policy can refer personnel, who deal with sensitive
information, to an alternate policy that contains the detailed procedures needed to
complete the task and is not widely distributed. An example could read: "Passwords will
be changed in accordance with department standards. See your department password
policy for further information." [Ref. 14] This type of statement would inform personnel
that a password policy exists, but only gives that information to authorized personnel who
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have access to the policy. When using an informative policy in this way, it is important
to ensure that all associated references are kept up to date and well organized.
D. COMPONENTS OF POLICIES
While there are many different types of policies covering numerous different
procedures and guidelines, they all contain the same common components. Depending
on the policy, these components may be defined explicitly or they could be less defined
and require careful reading of the policy to extract them. Regardless of whether the
policy is explicit or implicit in its description of the commponents, nearly all effective
policies contain the ten items described in this section. [Ref. 14]
• Statement of Policy: This is the most important part of any policy. It is a
brief, clearly written statement that states in words what is to be expected of
personnel. It must give the reader enough information for them to decide
whether provisions of the policy bind them. Additionally, it must imply
whether it is a policy oriented towards people, procedures, equipment, money,
or communications, etc.
• Authorizing Executive/Officer: Most often this is the senior executive
officer of the organization. This is the person who has the overall
responsibility to ensure the organization's adherence to the policy.
• Policy Author/Sponsor: This is the name of the individual or group of
individuals that developed the policy. The name(s) should be contained within
the policy itself, therefor allowing any questions, comments, interpretations,
or clarifications to be addressed directly to the authors.
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• Reference to Other Policies and Regulations: In many cases policies are
related to other policies or procedures that already exists. Because changes in
these referring policies may affect related policies, this reference makes
maintenance of the policy structure easier to administer and more responsive
to normal changes.
• Measurement Expectations: Conforming to policies is not always followed
by a simple yes or no answer. Conditions that need to be clarified in a
security policy, but would make the wording overly complicated and long-
winded can be included in this section.
• Process for Requesting Exception: This is a statement of the process for
which exceptions can be requested. If they are no exceptions it should be so
stated. This should not be a section that defines the conditions under which
exceptions will be granted or a list of possible exceptions, but only the process
to requesting an exception. Being too explicit in defining the acceptable
exclusions will lead to receiving an abundance of exception request.
• Process for Requesting Change of Policy: All successful policies have a
built-in procedure to allow for change. In some cases the change may only be
a technical review, in others a full overhaul of existing procedures may be
needed to account for shifts in technology, management styles, or
organizational philosophies.
• Action Upon Violation: A policy with no punishment when violated should
not be a policy. At a minimum, this section should include an
acknowledgement by the violator's supervisor that the policy has been
98
correctly followed. Depending on the sensitivity of the policy, a violation
could result in job termination or, in some cases, legal action being taken. In
these situation it is important that the policy make a statement to the effect of
"....violation may result in termination of employment and/or legal action."
[Ref. 14]
• Effective Date: All policies need to given a date for which they are to be
effective. This date should not be prior to the release date of the policy,
however prior events can be included as a Measurement Expectation or
actually stated in the policy statement.
•. Sunset or Review Date: Every policy should have an expiration date or a
reconfirmation date. This is important because this date will ensure that the
policy is reviewed periodically.
E. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
1. Risk Assessment
Conducting a risk assessment is an important step in developing a security policy.
There are 3 basic questions to ask when performing a risk assessment. These are: 1)
What am I trying to protect? 2) What do I need to protect against? 3) How much time,
effort, and money am I willing to expend to obtain adequate protection? [Ref. 15] It is
very important to know the value of the information you are trying to protect, what the
threat to the information could be, and how much money you are ready to pay to protect
it. To do this, there are three steps that should be taken. These are: 1) Identify the
assets to be protected, 2) identify the threat to each asset, and 3) calculate risks. In
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identifying assets, accounting of tangible assets such as computers, proprietary data,
technical manuals and books, printouts, personnel and audit records should be
considered. Also, intangibles such as safety of personnel, privacy of users, passwords,
and company reputation should be considered. Threats to consider would certainly
include environmental threats like earthquake, flood, or fire. Other threat considerations
could be illness or loss of key personnel, loss of network services, loss of utilities,
viruses, data theft, or malicious insiders. Once the risks are identified, they must be
quantified as to their importance. Risk calculation involves the cost incurred due to loss
of an asset. Time is money therefore the amount of time assets are off-line due to failure
must be considered as well as total losses. Risk considerations would include non-
availability for specified periods of time, loss or destruction, and unauthorized disclosure
within the organization or to outsiders. Security comes with a price. Based on the assets
to protect, threat to these assets, and the cost of losing these assets, through cost-benefit
analysis, a determination can be made as to the value of information and how much
money should be spent on its protection.
2. Trade-offs
Tight security can be expensive and usually involves inconvenience to the users.
As each layer of security is added to a system, the user must authenticate access through
these layers to carry out tasks. How much inconvenience the users are willing to accept
should not be a consideration. But the amount of time consumed by users due to tight
security is a consideration. A balance must be found. Once again, the risk to assets and
cost of loss is the primary focus.
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Manpower placed on the security team should be of primary importance.
Computer security should never be a collateral duty unless the information and assets
protected are of negligible value. Therefore, money spent on a well-trained security team
should be proportional to the value of the assets protected.
3. Training
Initial training should be conducted with each new employee. This training must
contain training designed to promote security policy, enhance user knowledge of the
system, and emphasize the consequences of poor security. Also included in this training
would be the penalties for failure to observe policy.
Periodic training should be conducted to keep users abreast of current threats as
well as providing refresher training on old topics. The frequency of this training would
be based, once again, on how well the systems assets should be protected. Time in
training, although not time that users are being productive, will be time well spent in the
long run.
Training reviews should be conducted on a periodic basis. These reviews are for
the purpose of assessing how well users are being trained. Review methods would
include a review of security failures, personnel questionnaires and security quizzes, or
other logged incidents that could affect security.
F. POLICY GUIDELINES WHEN MONITORING
1. Monitor Capabilities
When writing a security policy, and a plan is in place to conduct internal system
monitoring, the monitoring must be incorporated into the policy and the training plan.
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Once the monitor's capabilities are understood, these capabilities can become the core
considerations within a security plan. These monitoring capabilities, once taught to the
users, will provide them with an awareness of security wrong-doing and make them
aware of the fact that they are being monitored on the job. Placed in the context of
"monitoring to enforce policy" and not "monitoring to catch people goofing off," it will
be easier to sell the idea to the users. The importance of protecting system assets must
always be emphasized, in policy and training.
2. Monitor Implementation
The implementation of the monitor requires careful consideration. How often is
monitoring desired? How much overhead is acceptable? What features will be
enabled/disabled? A thorough review of the monitor documentation prior to installation
is of utmost importance. The frequency of monitoring can also determine the size of the
security team. For example, if monitoring is required for a system that is used 24 hours
per day, then real-time monitoring might be desired. For real-time monitoring, it would
be desirable to have a security response team to respond to alerts from the monitor. If the
protected assets are considered "not worth" constant monitoring due to the overhead
involved or for other reasons, batch processing on a set schedule might be the best
choice. Then again, perhaps monitoring on a random basis is desired. Once all possible
options are considered, and the choice of monitoring frequency is made, then installation
can begin. Now the features you wish to activate must be known. During setup, the
configuration must be documented and set forth, step by step, in the security policy as a
guideline in the event the system fails and the monitor must be reinstalled. Changes to
the monitor configuration should be carefully recorded and maintained. Not only will
102
this record an accurate configuration, but it will provide a record of previous
configuration in the event something goes wrong during a configuration change.
3. The Monitoring Team
A team of well-trained and qualified security professionals should make up the
monitoring team. The computer security manager would oversee this operation or be the
team leader. It would probably be best to have one person, well-trained in monitoring, to
head the team under the oversight of the security manager. Once again, the question of
"How much risk is acceptable?" must be asked. Along with the frequency of monitoring,
the makeup of the monitoring team is dependent on this frequency. Naturally, a real-time
monitoring operation can require a 24 hour response team although not necessarily. The
system may continue to monitor real-time in the background while not sending out alerts
until the security team reports for normal daytime duty. But if the information protected
is so vital, and perhaps questionable employees are involved, a 24 hour manned response
team might be the best choice.
G. SUMMARY
A well-written and effectively communicated computer security policy can
greatly help an organization prepare for the twenty-first century. By specifying the goals
of an organization, at it relates to computing, the computer security policy can improve
the efficiency of an organization, provide employees with a clear direction, and protect
sensitive information. While policies should always be tailored to an organization's
specific needs, they generally fall into three categories: regulatory, advisory, and
informative. When developing a security policy it is important to consider risk
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assessment, trade-off, and employee training. Additionally, if a monitoring capability is
available, or desired, it must be incorporated into the security policy and training plan.
Once the employees have been fully trained, the monitoring capabilities could become
the foundation of an organization's computer security policy.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. CONCLUSION
This thesis addresses internal threats to system security, profiling and monitoring,
and considerations for establishing a policy to incorporate profiling and monitoring as an
integral part of an overall security plan. Time and again, statistics are issued by various
organizations that state at least seventy percent of all security breaches are caused by
insiders—intentional or accidental. [Ref. 1 ] One way to mitigate the risk of security
breaches is to enforce security policy by monitoring computer systems. With classified
information on many military computer systems, we believe it would be highly
worthwhile to monitor these systems for suspicious activity. Computer profiling software
is available today and can perform many of the functions needed to protect sensitive
information by monitoring user activity on the computer system.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
With the complex and diverse computer systems available today, a monitoring
system must be capable of handling this diversity. For example, a network that
incorporates both Unix and Windows NT operating systems would need a monitor
capable of "seeing" both systems. This mix of operating systems currently exists in the
Navy today. Any monitoring application chosen for security duty must be capable of
monitoring a distributed system. CMDS has the capability of monitoring both Unix and
Windows NT.
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C. TOPICS FOR FURTHER STUDY
C Language Integrated Production System (CLIPS) is an expert system tool that
may be used to refine and tailor the Computer Misuse Detection System (CMDS).
Although our research did not allow us to look into the usefulness of this tool, it is
available and worth the research to determine if it would enhance the monitoring
capabilities needed for the monitoring and protection of classified military information
systems.
It was difficult to experiment with CMDS due to the need to have root passwords
to adequately set up and continually monitor the package. It would be invaluable to run
CMDS on a large network to achieve some real, tangible data on this application or an
application of equivalent merits under the supervision of a system administrator. The
limited size of the lab we used did not provide a sufficient testbed. A testbed needs to be
constructed and made available for future experiments.
In addition to monitoring a large network, research into monitoring access to
classified files is needed. Assignment of users to clearance levels and compartments,
then monitoring to detect access to information above a user's clearance level and
compartments could enhance the protection of classified information on military
computer systems.
One possible research topic could be the use of Border Gateway Protocols
(BGPs). A BGP is a protocol for exchanging routing information between gateway hosts
in a network of autonomous systems and is often the protocol used between gateway
hosts on the Internet. The primary function of a BGP system is to exchange network-
reachable information, this includes information about the list of autonomous system
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paths with other BGP systems. With the increasing reliance on the Internet, research on
how to incorporate BGP systems and CMDS into workable computer security policy is
needed.
Firewalls are critical to the success of secured connections to external networks
and the Internet. [Ref. 1 4] While this thesis discusses the internal threats to computer
systems, it would be beneficial to look at how CMDS and firewalls would react and how
to incorporate them both into a well-defined computer security.
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APPENDIX A. CMDS ALERTS AND WARNINGS [Ref. 13]
SUN/SOLARIS ALERTS AND WARNINGS










CMDS generates this alert when a network user turns
the accounting stream on or off.
ad
16 4, 6, 10, 42, 76,





CMDS generates this alert when a network user







9 6159 FailedSU CMDS generates this alert when a network user
attempts to gain the SU privilege and fails. Superuser
is a privileged account on all systems and bypasses
controls.
lo
13 10 File Mode
Setuid
CMDS generates this alert when a network user sets
a file's setuid bit. The setuid bit on a file allows a
process to change the file's privilege level. The setuid





CMDS generates this alert whenever a process
changes a file's privilege. Setuid files must change





CMDS generates this alert when network users
connect to a target machine via sendmail without a
login. Older versions of operating systems allow a
user to run an executable on the sendmail port.
2 23 System Reboot
System
Shutdown
CMDS generates these alerts when a network user
reboots or shuts down a machine that may adversely
affect resource availability.
pc, ex
14 6154 or 6155 Tagged Users CMDS generates this alert when a network user you
have tagged in the taggedusers file logs on to a target
machine.
lo
8 6154 or 6155 Three
logfailures
CMDS generates this alert whenever a network user






Threshold Alert The threshold is the historical average number of
records in a daily profile for a category plus one
standard deviation. CMDS generates an alert
whenever a network user has exceeded the threshold
in a statistical category. The number of profile days





CMDS generates this alert when a user who is on the
vacation list starts generating audit data. The
vacation list indicates periods of time that the named
user should not be generating audit data.
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12 8 CD Outside
SHOME
CMDS warns you when a network user changes
his working directory to be outside of his home
directory.
fc
15 72, 73, 74, 75,
80, 81, 82, 83
Failed Read CMDS warns you whenever a failed read occurs
for a file. Read failures can indicate many things,
including file browsing, bad path parameters, and
other system behaviors which affect performance.
fc, fd,
fr, fw
10 6159 SuccessfulSU CMDS warns you when a network user gains the
SU privilege. When a user attains system
privileges, he can bypass all controls.
lo
10
TRUSTED SOLARIS ALERTS AND WARNINGS
CMDS Alerts for Trusted Solaris.
ALERT MESSAGE INTERPRETATION
Accounting Change CMDS generates this alert when a network user changes accounting status.
Adjtime used CMDS generates this alert when adjtime is used to change a system's internal
clock.
Administrative Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for administrative use is
exceeded.
Application Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for an application is exceeded.
Browsing Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for browsing is exceeded. File
browsing is a serious problem in today's multi-user environments.
Core dump CMDS generates this alert when a process has dumped core.
Critical File CMDS generates this alert when a user modifies a critical file or makes changes
to file content.
Dev Alloc Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for device allocation is
exceeded.
Device alloc CMDS generates this alert when a user allocates the CD-ROM drive, the floppy
drive, or the microphone. A user who allocates the floppy drive often may be
writing data to a "single-level device," which does not understand security
labels.
DisableAudit CMDS generates this alert when a network user disables auditing.
Eeprom changed CMDS generates this alert when a network user changes eeprom (electrically
erasable programmable read-only memory).
Executions Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for executions is exceeded.
Host name set CMDS generates this alert when a network user sets up a host name.
Log Fail Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for log failures is exceeded.
MailAttack CMDS generates this alert when a network user connects to a target machine
via sendmail without a login. Older versions of operating systems allow a user
to run an executable on the sendmail port.
Networking Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for networking is exceeded.
PasswordFail CMDS generates this alert whenever a network user has three password
failures.
PrivilegeUpgrade CMDS generates this alert whenever a process changes a file's privilege. Setuid
files must change process user ID during execution to change privilege level.
Process Operations Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for process operations is
exceeded.
Read Fail Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for read failures is exceeded.
Read failures can indicate file browsing, bad path parameters, or other system
behaviors which may affect system performance.
Reboot CMDS generates this alert when a network user reboots a target system.
X Security Events Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for X security events is
exceeded.
Set Security Attr Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for setting security attributes is
exceeded.
Settimeofday used CMDS generates this alert when a network user re-sets the time of day.
SetuidRoot CMDS generates this alert when a network user sets a file's setuid bit. The
setuid bit on a file allows a process to change the file's privilege level. The
setuid bit is one way computer hackers and viruses can disrupt the system.
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Shutdown CMDS generates this alert when a network user shuts down a target system.
Superuser Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for superuser activity is
exceeded.
TaggedUser CMDS generates this alert when a tagged user logs on to a target machine.
Total Records Threshold CMDS generates this alert whenever a user has exceeded a threshold. A
threshold is the historical average number of records in a daily profile for a
category, plus one standard deviation. The number of profile days can be
configured in the Minimum Profile field at $CMDS_DIR/targets/<target
type>/config/ configuration.<target type>.
Trusted Fac Mgmt Threshold CMDS generates this alert when a user manipulates the "Trusted Path" to
change some part of they system.
Unattrib. Events Threshold CMDS generates this alert when the threshold for unattributable events is
exceeded.
Vacation Activity CMDS generates this alert when a user who is on the vacation list starts
generating audit data. The vacation list indicates periods of time that the named
user should not be generating data.
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CMDS Warnings for Trusted Solaris.
WARNING MESSAGE INTERPRETATION
Added role CMDS generates this warning when a network user adds a role.
Added user account CMDS generates this warning when a network user adds a user account.
Change labelfailed CMDS warns you when a network user attempts to change a label but fails.
Change label succeeded CMDS warns you when a network user successfully changes a label.
ChangeDirectory CMDS warns you when a user changes his working directory to be outside
of his SHome directory. This could indicate file browsing which is a serious
problem in today's multi-user environments.
Chown used CMDS warns you when a network users changes file ownership by chown.
Client not privileged CMDS generates this warning when a network user tries to utilize an
unauthorized privilege.
Covert channel used CMDS generates this warning when a network user uses a covert channel.
Crontab create CMDS generates this warning when a user creates a crontab entry.
DAC access denial CMDS generates this warning when a user attempts to access a file on
which discretionary access has been placed.
Enable login CMDS generates this warning when the system first boots up, and a user
with the proper authorization logs in to enable the system to be used by
normal users. Multiple instances of this warning would indicate multiple
reboots.
Exportfs used CMDS generates this alert when a file system is exported with exportfs.
Failed Read CMDS warns you whenever a failed read occurs for a file. Read failures
may indicate many behaviors, including file browsing, bad path parameters,
or other system behaviors which affect performance.
Fchown used CMDS generates this alert when fchown is used to change the owner and
group of a file.
File privilegefailed CMDS generates this warning when a user's set file privilege fails.
Ftpd access denial CMDS generates this warning when a network user attempts to access an
FTP daemon but fails.
Ftpd authentication CMDS generates this warning when a network user attempts to authenticate
an FTP daemon but fails.
Ftpd login CMDS generates this warning when a network user attempts to login to an
FTP daemon but fails.
MAC access denial CMDS generates this warning when a user attempts to move data from a
file or directory with Mandatory Access Control.
Modified role CMDS generates this warning when a network user modifies a role.
Mount used CMDS generates this warning when a network user uses mount to mount a
device.
Newgrp CMDS generates this warning when a network user creates a new group
using the newgrp command.
Ptrace used CMDS warns you when a network user uses ptrace.
Security attr changed CMDS generates this warning when a user changes security attributes.
Sensitivity label downgradefailed CMDS generates this warning when a user attempts to downgrade a
sensitivity label but fails.
Sensitivity label upgradefailed CMDS generates this warning when a user attempts to upgrade a sensitivity
label but fails.
Setfile privilege CMDS warns you when a network user modifies a set file privilege.
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Setcmwlabel CMDS warns you when a network user changes setcmwlabel.
Setdomainname used CMDS generates this warning when a network user uses setdomainname to
create or change a domain name.
Setregid used CMDS generates this warning when a network user uses setregid.
Setreuid used CMDS generates this warning when a network user uses setregid.
SuccessfulSU CMDS warns you when a network user gains superuser privilege. When a
user attains system privileges, he can bypass all controls.
Tnetd turned off CMDS generates this warning when a user turns off a telnet daemon.
Umount used CMDS generates this warning when a user uses umount to unmount a
device.
Vtrace used CMDS warns you when a network user uses vtrace
Xtarget conn CMDS warns you when a network user makes an X target connection.
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WINDOWS NT ALERTS AND WARNINGS
CMDS Alerts for Windows NT.
Alert Message Interpretation
Attempted criticalfile modification CMDS generates this alert when a network user attempts to modify a
critical file to gain access privileges.
Audit events discarded CMDS generates this alert when the event log has reached the maximum
size and has started to automatically delete the oldest events.
Audit log has been cleared CMDS generates this alert when the event log has been cleared
automatically or manually.
Audit policy has been changed CMDS generates this alert when audit attributes have been modified.
Privilege Use Failed CMDS generates this alert when an unsuccessful privilege change is
attempted (i.e., administrator logoff).
Special Privilege Used CMDS generates this alert when a role requiring special privileges (i.e.,
administrator logon) is used.
System Reboot
System Shutdown
CMDS generates this alert when a network user shuts down machines and
adversely affects resource availability.
Tagged Users CMDS generates this alert when a tagged user logs on to a target machine.
Three logfallures CMDS generates this alert whenever a network user has three password
failures.
Vacation Activity CMDS generates this alert when a user who is documented as being on the
vacation list starts generating audit data. The vacation list indicates periods
of time that the named user should not be generating audit data.
CMDS Warnings for Windows NT.
Warning Message Interpretation
Administrative Function Used CMDS warns you when a function requiring special administrator privilege
is successful (i.e., new user added or deleted).
Failed Read CMDS warns you whenever a failed read occurs for a file. Read failures
may indicate many behaviors, including file browsing, bad path parameters,
or other system behaviors which affect performance.
Special privilege used CMDS warns you when a new login shows that a user has special
privileges (i.e., administrator).
User logon CMDS warns you when any user logs on to the NT target machine.
HP/UX ALERTS AND WARNINGS




CMDS generates this alert when a network user attempts to modify a critical file to
gain access privileges.
Auditing disabled CMDS generates this alert when a network user attempts to disable the CMDS
audit stream.
FailedSU CMDS generates this alert when a network user attempts to gain SU privilege and
fails. Superuser is a privileged account on all systems and bypasses controls.
Privilege Upgrade CMDS generates this alert whenever a process' user ID level is changed. Setuid
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files must change process user ID during execution to change privilege level.
System Reboot CMDS generates this alert when a network user reboots a machine and adversely
affects resource availability.
Tagged Users CMDS generates this alert when a tagged user logs on to a target machine.
Threshold Alert CMDS generates this alert whenever a network user has exceeded the threshold in
a statistical category. A threshold is the historical average number of records in a
daily profile for a category, plus one standard deviation. The number of profile
days can be configured in the Minimum Profile field at
$CMDS_DIR/targets/<target type>/config/ configuration.<target type>.
Vacation Activity CMDS generates this alert when a user who is documented as being on the
vacation list starts generating audit data. The vacation list indicates periods of
time that the named user should not be generating audit data.
CMDS Warnings for HP/UX.
Warning Message Interpretation
CD Outside S HOME CMDS warns you when a network user changes his working directory to be
outside of his home directory.
Failed Read CMDS warns you whenever a failed read occurs for a file. Read failures can
indicate many things, including file browsing, bad path parameters, or other
system behaviors which affect performance.
Successful SU CMDS warns you when a network user has been successful and gained the SU
privilege. Superuser is a privileged account on all systems and bypasses controls.
INTERLOCK ALERTS AND WARNINGS
CMDS Alerts for InterLock.
ALERT MESSAGE DESCRIPTION INTERPRETATION
RootLogin Login as ROOT on the Firewall User logged on to firewall as ROOT
ConsoleLogin Login on Firewall Console User logged on to the Administrator
Console
FtpRoot Ftp login as ROOT User logged on to FTP as ROOT
InboundConnections Repeated Inbound Connections X (configurable) inbound attempts
within Y (configurable) minutes
CMDS Warnings for InterLock.
WARNING MESSAGE DESCRIPTION INTERPRETATION
AolConnections Threshold: AOL Connections AOL connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
A oiln Bytes Threshold: AOL Bytes IN AOL Bytes IN exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
AolOutBytes Threshold: AOL Bytes OUT AOL Bytes OUT exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
FtpConnections Threshold: FTP Connections FTP connections exceeded historical
16
profile threshold for private side
address
FtpFailLogin FTP Failed Login Failed FTP login on private side
FtpInBytes Threshold: FTP Bytes IN FTP Bytes IN exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
FtpOutBytes Threshold: FTP Bytes OUT FTP Bytes OUT exceeded historical
profile for private side address
FtpUnauthConn FTP Unauthorized Connection Failed FTP connection because of
denial of permission
FtpUnauthDest FTP Unauthorized Destination Failed FTP connection because of
invalid IP address
Http Connections Threshold: HTTP Connections AOL connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
HttpInBytes Threshold: HTTP Bytes IN HTTP Bytes IN exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
HttpOutBytes Threshold: HTTP Bytes OUT HTTP Bytes OUT exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
HttpPasswdExpired Password expired for http user HTTP password has expired
HttpUserUnk HttpUser Unknown Failed HTTP connection because user
is unknown
Nntp Seconds Threshold: NNTP Seconds NNTP seconds exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
NntpConnections Threshold: NNTP Connections NNTP connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
RootFailed Root failed authentication Failed root login on firewall
SmtpConnections Threshold: SMTP Connections SMTP connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
SmtpInBytes Threshold: SMTP Bytes IN SMTP Bytes IN exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
SmtpOutBytes Threshold: SMTP Bytes OUT SMTP Bytes OUT exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
TaggedlpAddr Traffic To or from a Tagged IP
Address
Connection to or from a tagged public
side address
TelnetConnections Threshold: Telnet Connections Telnet connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
TelnetlnBytes Threshold: Telnet Bytes IN Telnet Bytes IN exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
TelnetOutBytes Threshold: Telnet Bytes OUT Telnet Bytes OUT exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
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address
TotalConnections Threshold: Total Connections Total connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
TotallnBytes Threshold: Total Bytes IN Total Bytes FN exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
TotalOutBytes Threshold: Total Bytes OUT Total Bytes OUT exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
UnauthConnections Threshold: Unauthorized Connections Total unauthorized connections
exceeded historical profile threshold
for private side address
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RAPTOR ALERTS AND WARNINGS
CMDS Alerts for Raptor.
ALERT MESSAGE DESCRIPTION INTERPRETATION
AccessDenied Access denied Authentication failed for user
Error Gateway hiccup: error Internal Raptor error
GwShutdown Shutdown command received,
gwcontrol quitting
User has shut down the Raptor Firewall
ProcessKilled Unauthorized process killed User has killed a process he was not
authorized to kill
UnknownEntity Unknown entity connected to
readeagle
An unknown entity has connected to the
Firewall
CMDS Warnings for Raptor.
WARNING MESSAGE DESCRIPTION INTERPRETATION
AolConnections Threshold: AOL Connections AOL connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
ConflgFile Config file not from authorized
machine
Firewall detected that config file that
was read in was NFS mounted
DenyAccess Denied access to command The user has been denied access to a
command.
FtpConnections Threshold: FTP Connections FTP connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
Http Connections Threshold: HTTP Connections AOL connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
NntpConnections Threshold: NNTP Connections NNTP connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
PasswdChange Password Changed User has changed password
RemoteConnect Unauthorized remote connect
attempt from host
User has attempted to connect from a
remote host
SmtpConnections Threshold: SMTP Connections SMTP connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
TelnetConnections Threshold: Telnet Connections Telnet connections exceeded historical
profile threshold for private side
address
TotalConnections Threshold: Total Connections Total connections exceeded historical





exceeded historical profile threshold
for private side address
VerifyEthernet Cannot verify ethemet address The ethemet address to which Raptor
is attempting to connect canot verified
VPN VPN authentication failed User has entered a VPN site which has
failed authentication
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APPENDIX B. ERROR MESSAGES. [Ref. 13]
Historical profile error messages
Message Cause
x Error: User Name, Target, Start and End Date must be
specified.
You did not enter any inputs for user name, target
machine name, start or end date.
x Error: Date not in CCYYMMDD format. The start or end date you entered is not in the
CCYYMMDD format.
x Error: Date <Date entered> is invalid. Month must be
between 1-12 and Day must be between 1-31.
The start or end date day you entered is less than 1 or
greater than 31 or the month you entered is less than 1 or
greater than 12.
x Error: Date cannot exceed current date. The start or end date you entered is greater than today's
date.
x Error: End date must be at least one day past the Start
Date.
The start date you entered is greater than or equal to the
end date.
i No Historical Data was found for <user name> at
<target> between <start date> to <end date>.
The historical profile you entered does not exist.
i No Historical Data was found between <date> to
<date>.
There is no historical data for the dates you entered.
x Error: Historical Data was found starting at <date data
found>.
The start date you entered has no data, so the Historical
Profiles function informs you of the date of the first set of
data found.
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Daily Profile Error Messages.
Message Cause
x Error: User Name, Target and Date must be specified. You did not enter any inputs for user name, target
machine name, or date.
x Error: Date not in CCYYMMDD format. The date you entered is not in the CCYYMMDD
format.
x Error: Date <date entered> is invalid. Month must be
between 1-12 and day must be between 1-31.
The day you entered is less than 1 or greater than 3
1
or the month you entered is less than 1 or greater than
12.
x Error: Date cannot exceed current date. The date you entered is later than today's date.
x Error: Target <target entered> does not exist. The target you entered does not exist.
i Profile for <user name> does not exist on <date entered>
(CCYYMMDD).
The profile you entered does not exist.
x Error: Problems opening Profile Data for <user> at
<date>(CCYYMMDD).
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